

SHAME AND GUILT

Sociology as a Poietic System

SHAME AND GUILT

1. At the Crossroads of Synchronic and Diachronic Analysis

Certain plausible reasons have been put forward for why the study of shame, which was man's first knowledge according to the Biblical story, is today located in the most "unenlightened" part of the map of human knowledge. Erikson maintained that the main reason why shame has been insufficiently studied resides in the particular nature of our civilization, in which shame was "so early and easily absorbed by guilt" (Erikson, 1963, 252). Lynd argued in a similar vein that it is difficult to see shame as a separate feeling after it has been concealed by the more "modern" feeling of guilt, resulting in shame being "subsumed under, or neglected in, the study of guilt" (Lynd 1961, 23).

If shame today has begun to attract more attention than guilt after initially having been forgotten, this does not mean that guilt has already been understood. This is rather connected with the conviction that understanding guilt first requires an understanding of its descriptive counterpart. As Williams put it, "(s)hame can understand guilt, but guilt cannot understand itself."¹

Shame has to be defined against a background comprised of similar or related feelings, such as honor, pride, and guilt. The definition of shame must also address other feelings with which shame is coupled, such as shyness and modesty, as well as feelings such as distress, contempt, disgust, terror, fear, and so forth, from which it has to be distinguished.

It appears that certain feelings are more easy to distinguish from shame than others. This distinction is first of all considered to be one of deepness of the effect. For Tomkins, shame is the feeling that "strikes deepest into the heart of man." Feelings such as *distress* and *terror* are the affect of suffering, make "of the world a vale of tears," speak "to life and death," cause "wounds," but they nevertheless only "penetrate

¹The argument runs as follows: "If we come to understand our shame, we may also better understand our guilt. The structure of shame contains the possibility of controlling and learning from guilt, because they give a conception of one's ethical identity, in relation to which guilt can make sense" (Williams 1993, 93).

the smooth surface of the ego." Shame never comes "alone," but rather simultaneously brings forth a feeling "of indignity, of defeat, of transgression, and of alienation" (Tomkins 1995, 133). The horror of this alienation is that it is alienation from Life itself, not from some particular aspect of life; it is alienation from a world which has no "contrary" or "other."

Since it is difficult to distinguish in the same manner between shame and guilt on the level of affect, Tomkins therefore subordinated them, together with shyness, to one and the same affect, which he called "shame-humiliation." But one "compromise" leads to another. It is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to distinguish "shame-humiliation" from yet another affect, namely, "disgust-contempt," especially in the case of "self-disgust," which is often a companion of shame (Tomkins 1995, 134).

Darwin's work on the expression of emotions also provides little help in this respect. While he discussed guilt early in his work as a feeling separate from shame that as such should have a different expression, he at the same time appointed guilt as a *moral cause* of shame (Darwin 1989, 260). This apparently has left a quite confused impression as to whether or not Darwin did distinguish clearly between shame and guilt when guilt (real or imaginary) proceeds the feeling of shame and is one of its elicitors.²

It is easy to see in what sense *honor* is the "other" of *shame* when these feelings emerge as clear opposites to each other and the presence of the one feeling means the absence of the other. One is either dishonored and ashamed, or has honor and is thus not ashamed. The same appears to be true for the difference between shame and pride, which normally culminates in the discussion of *self-esteem*. In both of these cases we find discernable oppositions that mutually exclude each other and do not overlap.

It is much more difficult to see in what sense the feelings of *shame* and *guilt* are in perfect opposition to each other when they are recognized simultaneously as distinct, complementary, and even inseparable parts of one and the same complex feeling. As Lynd observed, the two terms are most often used in combination as if they were one descriptive term, or at least treated as different focuses of one and the same phenomenon, that sometimes overlap and sometimes replace or stimulate each other (Lynd 1961, 23). Others, such as Heller, speak about one single emotion, namely, "shame-guilt" (Heller 1985, 6). Anthropologists assert that "(I)n a culture where shame is a major sanction, people are chagrined about acts which we expect people to feel guilty about" (Benedict 1989, 222). Some psychologists, on the other hand,

²Michael Lewis, for example, criticizes Darwin for not being able to "distinguish between shame and guilt or, for that matter, between shame and shyness, or modesty, or embarrassment." But Lewis at the same time also claims that although Darwin "does not make much of a distinction between shyness, embarrassment, and shame, he does distinguish these three emotions from guilt" (M. Lewis 1992, 23).

claim that under some circumstances shame is transformed to guilt or that "(g)uilt is used to bypass shame, since it is a less acute emotion" (M. Lewis 1992, 121). If human beings indeed are capable of "choosing" which emotion to experience as if this were only a matter of personal preference, then any question concerning the distinction between shame and guilt would appear to be altogether dismissed. Nevertheless, this state of affairs forces the conclusion that although shame and guilt overlap each other in space and time, guilt has to be acknowledged as "secondary to shame" insofar as guilt cannot be "bypassed" in the same manner and the reduction of the guilt feeling into the shame feeling is not possible (ibid).

Although there is a tradition in the social sciences to designate the initial stage of development of the modern moral personality as a "shame-stage," Freud himself was not explicit about this possibility. For him there were rather two stages in the constitution of the feeling of guilt. It is clear that Freud's attention was focused on the emergence of guilt and the civilizational role which this feeling played, not on the more exact identification of the preparatory phase that made it possible for guilt to appear "on stage." Therefore, as has been noted, shame acquired the reputation of being an immature feeling of guilt.³ Viewed from the opposite perspective, however, we seem to have an equal right to talk about two stages of shame and to treat guilt as a "mature shame feeling." This impression is strengthened even further when we consider the heated discussions in modern anthropology concerning the peculiarity of the shame-driven ancient world that lay at the foundation of European civilization.

It is perhaps at this point that we find the reason why scholars have unequivocally agreed that the distinction between shame and guilt is the distinction most difficult to make. Unlike any other of the oppositions in which shame participates (such as shame/honor, shame/pride, and shame/self-esteem), the shame/guilt opposition has both *synchronic* and *diachronic analytical aspects*, while all other oppositions allow for no more than *synchronic analysis*. Furthermore, or rather because of this, studying this distinction becomes a crossroads for all social sciences that deal with the feeling of shame, such as history, classical science, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, linguistics, and sociology alike. Therefore, it cannot help but bring a host of unresolved theoretical problems and terminological difficulties to interdisciplinary scrutiny.

³In Erikson's discussion of the "Eight Ages of Man" in *Childhood and Society*, both shame and guilt belong to human childhood, although shame precedes guilt and is associated with the second "age of man," while guilt is associated with the third (Erikson 1963, 251-55). Modern psychological studies claim, however, that both shame and guilt most likely "emerge at about the same time," and that "after age 2 children show both shame and guilt" (M. Lewis 1992, 96). Furthermore, since shame has a cognitive element and requires thought, Lewis separated shame from primary emotions (such as joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, etc.), as well as exposed emotions (such as embarrassment, envy, empathy), and gave it the status of a *self-conscious evaluative emotion*. The status of shame as an immature feeling was thereby removed, placing shame in the same class with such a "mature feeling" as guilt (M. Lewis 1992, 87).

For these reasons, any interest in the distinction between shame and guilt is not a matter of choice. "The choice" has already been made. Unless this "Gordian knot" be cut with a "sword," the problem of shame can never be resolved.⁴

2. Active versus Passive Self

The concept of self is crucial in discussing the difference between the feelings of shame and guilt and the corresponding worlds that they apparently organize. However, it is also at this point that we most clearly realize that the existing theory of the social self is not sufficient to resolve the problem.

Many scholars seem to agree that while shame refers to the whole self, guilt does not. The question then arises concerning the structure of this "whole self," and how many "parts" this whole has. In an effort to avoid these obvious difficulties, some scholars prefer to distinguish between shame as referring to the whole self and guilt as referring to "things done or undone for which the self is responsible" (Lewis 1990, 241). Shame and guilt thus appear to have different referents, namely, self and action. But shame is also felt for certain types of "actions" as well as failure to act.

A great many interpretations can be found in the available literature concerning the difference that describes shame as a result of misconduct, inept conduct, inadequacy, impropriety, transgression of boundaries, being a misfit, or a failure to attain some type of standard due to personal shortcomings, while guilt involves a violation of norms and moral standards set forth to prevent one from injuring another. As soon as we try to verify any of these distinctions by applying them to concrete examples, we at once realize that they are *not sufficiently abstract*. While they may confirm the rule, they are also accompanied by a host of examples that clearly demonstrate the contrary.

For example, Helen Block Lewis is of the opinion that one of the reasons for shame can be "a failure of the whole self in the non-moral arena," such as failing to get a job, finish school, or win an athletic competition (H. Lewis 1990, 241). But guilt can also be evoked by failing to produce a present which a child has expected, failing to help a friend in need, or failing to save someone's life. Obviously, another distinction is needed. While considering both shame and guilt to be "consequences of the self's failure in regard to a standard goal, or rule," M. Lewis distinguished between them in respect to the self. Shame in this regard is considered to be "a *total* self failure

⁴In this respect the present study deviates from the tradition, in which the distinction between *shame* and *pride* enjoys sociological preference while the distinction between shame and honor is almost exceptionally an object of historical and anthropological interests. While the study of shame and guilt presupposes concerns about all other distinctions, its broader theoretical framework allows for them to be discussed in their interconnectedness.

vis-a-vis a standard," while guilt is "a specific self failure" (M. Lewis 1992, 9). This difference between the global and the specific refers to the fact that guilt requires a specific self orientation and a specific attribution. In other words, shame involves the whole self and leads to "global ideation" while guilt does not. This provides one possible explanation for why women are more predisposed than men to the shame-experience in that certain studies of depression have revealed that "females are more likely to make global attributions of failure than males" (ibid., 73). In respect to such global attribution, or the ability to draw a general conclusion from a single event, love is also a feeling that involves the whole self and leads to "a global ideation," and the withdrawal of love is one of those events "which induce self attribution of global self failure" (M. Lewis 1992, 117-18). But what these psychologists seem not to have taken into account, building their theories mainly on the observation of pathological cases, is the fact that people also blush and feel shame when their appearance or accomplishments become an object of excessive attention and praise. Therefore, "failure" also fails to serve as a criterion for distinguishing between shame and guilt.

On the other hand, it is strongly suggested that shame is concerned less with actions and more with the type of *person* one is, whereby the issue of actions is secondary to the quality of the person. For example, it is accepted in *aidos*-culture that good people perform good actions while bad people perform bad actions, and the one is not found without the other.⁵

Evaluating the condition of the self provides another possible basis for distinguishing between shame and guilt in Lewis's comparative phenomenology of these feelings. Lewis maintains that in shame the self is *passive* and becomes a focus of painful experience and angry attacks, feeling itself "unable, helpless to avoid the others' scorn," while guilt points to an *active self* that has the confidence it can repair the injury and presumably is able to do so (H. Lewis, 1990, 241).⁶ Scheff also emphasized that the "common thread" uniting the diverse experiences of guilt is "the possibility of injuring another," which also attests to "a potent, powerful, capable self" (Scheff 1990, 169). Yet another difference was suggested in respect to the "object of the self's orientation," namely, that the object of the self in the shame-experience is the

⁵Relevant to this point is the claim that "shame-culture could only be one in which the child is exhorted to be a particular kind of person rather than to refrain from a particular type of act" (Cairns 1993, 45).

⁶Support for this can be found in the corpus of anthropological studies concerning Mediterranean societies, whose cultural unity since the works of Pitt-Rivers and Peristiany (1965) has been increasingly perceived as based on a special value system that gravitates around the complementary codes of honor and shame. In a work which, as David Gilmore put it, presents a panoramic approach, Mediterranean peoples have come to be characterized as "more acted upon than acting," whereby causal priority is delegated to external stimuli (Gilmore 1987, 8).

self, while the object of the self in the guilt-experience is an action of the self that has affected another. The action which causes shame is thus an action that results in self-injury, while the self is oriented towards the other in the guilt-experience (M. Lewis 1992, 71).⁷

This distinction between *active* and *passive selves* changes the focus of attention since the opposition is no longer between the whole self and some part of it that is responsible for action, but rather between two different stages of one and the same self. The action that causes shame is thereby revealed to be a strange type of action, namely, an action that is caught in its own "trap," a "fettered action" that cannot leave its point of departure, that cannot be alienated, but rather boomerangs upon itself and causes self-injury. It could thus be argued that shame is not precisely the experience of a *subject* if the subject is that to which we attribute all rational actions, or instrumental reason. It instead points to a subject whose actions are "non-instrumental" since he himself is the instrument, apparently making shame an experience of yet *another type of subject* for whom social theory does not have a name.

Needless to say, shame has nothing to do with Jung's role-playing *persona*. It rather refers to that which lies beneath the *persona* and concerns the basic quality of the human being as such. When ashamed, the *self* experiences itself as an *object*, as "the focus of the experience," while in guilt the focus is on what has been done, or the object is the action itself as it has been alienated from the person and exists as a separate "thing."

If we still should say that both shame and guilt are felt for "actions," then these actions differ in quality. The one is a social action, while the other is some type of activity that does not lose its personal character and fails to become social. Therefore, the latter cannot be alienated from the person, nor can it be regarded as an "object" of perception, as a "thing." In the case of action that causes guilt, the action is not part and parcel of the individual actor. It rather belongs to a *role* and has nothing to do with the true nature of the agent himself.

If this inalienable "action" exists, it should be delegated to a subject. But this paradoxically means that we must search for yet *another subject in the self*, namely,

⁷Arguing against Dr Burgess, who claimed that he "blushes in the presence of his accusers," Darwin suggested that shame does not require a *conscience* or a sense of being guilty. The crimson on the face is rather effected by "the thought that others think or know us to be guilty," regardless of whether this is in fact the case (Darwin 1989, 261). It seems that Darwin nevertheless suggested a difference between 1) a man who thinks that he has done something for which he should be punished (guilt) and 2) a man who has done something for which he thinks *the other* will want to punish him (shame). Contrary to what M. Lewis claimed, it thus seems that, Darwin did indeed suggest a difference between shame and guilt in respect to the accuser, i.e., whether it be the self or the other, quite similar to what Lewis himself suggested.

a suppressed agent *enslaved* by his own inability to action, whose *activity* is therefore much less visible from the stage where "real action" takes place.

The action which causes shame is not separated from the individual as an object of planning and perception, and in this sense it is "inferior" and immature because the individual involved in the action himself becomes a *means* of his action. The action is, so to speak, non-externalized, or not yet "born," and it is thus inseparable from the individual, who has no means to externalize it. The essence of this action thus expresses the unique essence of the human being, which can neither be communicated to anyone else, nor delegated to an instrument. In this sense, it has the character of unalienable labor, or a personal need whose end, paradoxically enough, is the satisfaction of another's need. It may even appear from the point of view of an external observer that such an individual acts for the sake of action itself, which brings the individual no visible return. From a sociological point of view, this type of action lacks the quality necessary for it to be attached to a *role*.

In summary, the individual who experiences shame cannot be considered in respect to the views presented here as an actor who *plays a role*. He rather only *plays*, and from this play originates a type of "action" that should rather be described in terms of imitating action. Shame thus leads us to the realm of potential actions, which are not yet separated, or separable, from the person and, therefore, can have only a private meaning. Such "actions" are not social and should not be performed in public places. For that matter, the man who performs such actions should not even be considered to be a *person* in the strict sense of the word. However, even adults sometimes perform such actions, and they also feel shame for them. It is noteworthy that creative and unique actions also fall into the same category. But in order for such actions to be shown in public, it is necessary that they be "cultivated" through the use of a standard presentation technology.

The difficulty with this conclusion resides in the fact that both symbolic interactionists and role-theorists maintain that everyone always plays a role, even children and sick people, as if the possibility of taking the role of the other is guaranteed by some "inborn" quality and can never be lost. It is significant that differentiating between, on the one hand, playing and inter-playing and, on the other, playing roles and acting makes it possible to explore the difference between the world from which action arises but where it does not yet exist and the world of action itself.

It is obvious that it is impossible to distinguish between the two types of actions that cause shame and guilt by using the difference between rational and irrational actions because the actions in question are neither rational, nor irrational (Heller 1991, 13). The difficulty in this case comes from the fact that a typology of actions is first needed for this purpose. The most natural way to approach this problem from a sociological point of view is to see whether Weber's classification of the types of social actions can prove useful for distinguishing between these two types of emotive

actions when psychological and philosophical means have proven to be ineffective. The advantage of doing so is first to be seen in the fact that Weber's classification makes it possible to distinguish between actions according to their *degree of rationality*. By using this typology, we might therefore be able to construct the "history" of rational action in diachrony.

When compared in respect to the degree of their rationality, the actions that cause shame are less rational than those which cause guilt. The hypothesis that seems to provide a plausible explanation of the differences in the actions that cause these emotional experiences is that shame is felt for a *value-rational action* but cannot be felt for an *instrumental-rational action*, while the opposite is the case for guilt. Guilt presupposes *instrumental rationality* but cannot be felt for a *value rational action*. For example, guilt will not be felt for killing a human being when this is a value-rational action (the case of the soldier at the front), but the same action as *instrumentally rational* will be considered to be a crime that demands punishment in most cases.

The legal code obviously does not make such a "fine distinction." Killing is a crime regardless of whether it was performed by an individual capable of only instrumental rationality, or one capable of only value-rationality, where the instrument of the action cannot be actually separated from the person. Such "value-rational action," as in the case of *vendetta*, where the actor himself is also the instrument, will be treated as crime and viewed as "instrumental rationality" regardless of its motives, while the community members for whom this "action" was performed may plead "not guilty."

3. Ego/Ego-ideal versus Ego/Super-ego Relationships

If shame and guilt are different feelings, then we should assume that the individuals who experience these feelings are involved in two correspondingly different types of relationships with two different referents. In this case, the problem with the distinction between shame and guilt is apparently related to the fact that no clear distinction can be made between the referents of these otherwise different relationships. However, the referents in human relationships are not concrete objects (as in the case of fear), but rather other persons or authorities, whether they be single or collective, visible or invisible. Yet it is reasonable to assume that the referents in any case have objective *prototypes*, as do the relationships.

The psychoanalytical perspectives articulate the difference between shame and guilt in terms of two types of tensions in which the individual "I" can be involved: the result of rupture between the *ego* and the *ego-ideal* is shame; while the tension between the *ego* and the *super-ego* causes guilt. This view, inspired by the work of Piers and Singer (Piers and Singers 1971), has become very influential, and it

is shared today by all significant works in the field. Even in scientific disciplines quite distant from psychoanalysis, such as classical scholarship, the importance of the difference between shame as occurring "when a goal (presented by the *ego-ideal*) is not being reached" and guilt as touching or transgressing a boundary set by the *super-ego* has also been acknowledged (Cairns 1993, 18).

The importance of this distinction can first of all be seen in what appears to be the consequent possibility to distinguish between two different referents of the relationship. Such hopes are premature, however, since what actually occurs is the substitution of one obscure difference with another, not the illumination of a difference. This is so because the distinction between *ego-ideal* and *super-ego* remained phenomenological in Freud's works, and these two concepts were never clearly distinguished on functional grounds. It appears that both *ego-ideal* and *super-ego* are somehow connected with moral censorship and conscience, and the impression is left that they attempt to overpower each other and struggle to perform one and the same function (Freud, 1985A, 139).

There is no doubt that the concept of *super-ego* is much more developed and clear and is the focus of attention in Freud's analysis. Its emergence is intimately related with the transition from the first stage of personality development (eventually designated as the shame-stage) to the second, more advanced stage of guilt-consciousness, where external authority is internalized and the fear of loss of love "has been exchanged for the permanent internal unhappiness, for the tension of the sense of guilt" (Freud 1985B, 320). As Freud maintained, "authority is internalized through the establishment of a *super-ego*," and "it is not until now that we should speak of conscience or a sense of guilt" (ibid., 317). But when scholars assume that the "first stage" in the development of guilt-consciousness is dominated by the feeling of shame, they must also assume that shame is an experience in which the moralizing authority is not internalized, something with which classical scholars do not seem to agree.⁸

For Freud, however, the *super-ego* clearly is a product of the internalization of one particular authority, the father: "The child's ego has to content itself with the unhappy role of the authority - the father - who has been thus regarded. Here, as so often, the (real) situation is reversed: 'If I were the father and you the child, I should

⁸Cairns maintained in his analysis of *aidos* (shame) in the ancient Greek world that the basic distinction "between shame as a response to external sanctions and guilt as a response, uniquely, to internal sanctions" is incorrect. "At all stages," Cairns wrote, "both shame and guilt possess an internalized component, and neither is different from the other by the fact that it may occur before a real audience" (Cairns 1993, 27). Moreover, he argued that only in respect to a distinction between *socialization processes* can a difference be maintained between guilt and shame insofar as the distinction between internal and external sanctions is "supported not by consideration of the operation of such sanctions alone, but by certain a priori assumptions relating to the uniqueness of Western society" (ibid., 32).

treat you badly'" (Freud 1985B, 322). What is then the source of the *ego-ideal*, which is a product of the "split of the ego"? And more importantly, can it be so that all relationships of the child with the external world and the other are patterned after the father-child relationship, driven by fear of punishment and introducing into the personality the severe agent whom the child's aggressiveness confronts? (ibid., 322). Is "a suppressed aggressiveness" all that can be found in the individual ego? In any case, Freud clearly views the *father-child relationship* not as one ideal type among others but rather as the *prototype* for the relation that is responsible for the construction of the modern personality, whose morality is based on the sense of guilt.

Shame, however, cannot be accommodated to fit the pattern of this relationship. We thus have to assume that Freud is not concerned with the shame feeling at all, and that whatever he has to say expresses a view "from only one side of the border." But can the social world as a whole be regarded as a world based on or emerging out of one single social relationship?

4. Labor and Work

We can think of at least one more type of social relationship that does not fit the type described by Freud. This is a relationship that seems to have been formally "dismissed" today even though its pattern is as easy to discern as ever, namely, the *master-slave* relationship. The master is the person whose needs must be given priority and be satisfied by another person, who may have to leave his own needs in second place for that reason. The "slave," however, is not here understood as a person who is forced to labor for another, but is rather taken in a much broader sense insofar as this labor may also be voluntary. Stated otherwise, the point of concern here is one's "voluntary slavery" for the sake of life, or for the life of another. Needless to say, such action is not guided by any instrumental rationality but must rather be described as value-rational, where *life*, whether one's own or that of another, is regarded and respected as the highest value.

The master-slave relationship thus has no necessary connection with social differentiation between working and non-working classes, but rather is tied to the division between *labor* and *non-labor*, or *labor* and *work*. This latter distinction, which perhaps represents the most essential theoretical focus of Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition*, has not yet attracted the sociological attention it deserves, even though the sociologist against whom her criticism was directed in this respect was no other than one of sociology's most prominent founding fathers. Arendt criticized no less than Marx himself for his being unable to see the difference between labor and work, as a result of which he endowed labor "with certain faculties which only work possesses" and entered into insoluble contradictions (Arendt 1958, 102). As

Arendt put it, "in all stages of his work he defines man as an *animal laborans* and then leads him into a society in which this greatest and most human power is no longer necessary" (ibid., 105). Thus, because labor is the precondition for work, the source of all property and wealth (John Locke, Adam Smith), or the source of productivity and humanity (Marx), "(w)e are left with the rather distressing alternative between productive slavery and unproductive freedom" (ibid., 101, 105).⁹

The distinction between labor and work is also the guiding line around which Arendt's analysis of the emergence of society is organized and the main criterion for the distinction, celebrated in all social sciences, between *private* and *public realms*. And, as Arendt maintained, shame and labor go together and belong to the private realm, i.e., to the neglected and humiliated foundation, or source, of all humanity.

In working out the essential distinction between labor and work, Arendt notes that labor has been stigmatized since ancient times as inferior and slavish, as "necessitated by its needs," thereby giving rise to the struggle of human beings to "exclude labor from the conditions of man's life." "To labor meant to be enslaved by necessity and this enslavement was inherent in the conditions of human life," while to work meant to be free, to have one's needs taken care of (Arendt 1958, 83-84). Arendt accordingly saw the institution of slavery in antiquity not as "a device for cheap labor or an instrument of exploitation for profit," but rather as the most significant evidence of this struggle against necessity. The distinction between labor and work thereby took the form of a distinction between the occupations of the household inmates who "slaved for their own and their master's life" and "the *démourgoi*, the workmen of the people at large" (ibid., 81).

From a sociological point of view, the notorious negative attitude towards labor throughout the course of European civilization is a most curious, and even inexplicable, fact. Labor and "slave-labor" in the broad sense here defined as labor done for someone else have always had and still have social significance, and they will never be completely eliminated as long as there are people incapable of taking care of themselves. Such people do not need "resources" for satisfying their needs since the problem is that even if they do have them, they can make no use of them. What they instead need is a "living instrument," or a "slave," capable of caring for their needs and doing what they themselves cannot do for themselves. In this case, it is not just labor in general that is the source of all *humanity*, but rather *one's labor*

⁹ Arendt wrote that: "Marx's attitude towards labor, and that is toward the very center of his thought, has never ceased to be equivocal. While it was an 'eternal necessity imposed by nature' and the most human and productive of man's activities, the revolution, according to Marx, has not the task of emancipating the laboring classes but of emancipating man from labor; only when labor is abolished can the 'realm of freedom' supplant the 'realm of necessity.' For 'the realm of freedom begins only where labor determined through want and external utility ceases,' where 'the rule of immediate physical needs' ends" (Arendt 1958, 104).

for another that is performed as a substitute for the lack of another's labor. The needs that such labor is called upon to satisfy are the needs of another's life (including *social life*), whose reproduction and continuation cannot be considered as an "individual need."

The point of interest here is thus not the relationship between labor and work in general, but rather the relationship between *labor for another*, which in our modern world is considered to have no social function, and *work*, which is always organized around the performance of a particular social function. It is apparent that labor performed by a care-taker instead of someone else does not require a modern mind, or Mead's "taking the attitude of another towards oneself." What it does demand is rather a type of mind that allows *seeing yourself in the other* and acting as if his needs were yours, as if the other were you. This involves self-knowledge rather than knowledge of the other since he is equally a part of the same whole, or simply an equal. Such labor requires interpretative skills and a personal knowledge of feelings that cannot be found in the "book." In order to imagine a type of relationship whereby one is capable of being concerned about another's needs as one is about one's own and of acting for the other on the basis of knowing what his needs are, we must assume the existence of yet *another type of self* whose boundaries do not coincide with that of the body but rather stretch out beyond it. We must also presuppose the existence of another type of non-modern, ego-less consciousness that does not use the other as an instrument for satisfying one's own needs, but rather appoints itself as an instrument for satisfying another's needs. This action, however, is not necessarily connected with ego-less-ness since it may simply be carried out by another type of ego that labors not for itself but for the social whole to which the individual belongs.

With a change in perspective we may thus begin to perceive how what in one sense seems to be "slavish" is God's privilege in another. The common thing between gods and slaves is that they have both appointed themselves as "care-takers" of man. From the standard perspective, gods are the masters and human beings are the instruments that they use for satisfying their own needs, i.e., slaves. If we accept a different perspective, "from beneath," we may say that the rise of the new civilized man was also obliged to the "slave," to the care-taker, to the human being who appointed herself to the function of being a living instrument for satisfying man's needs.

The immortal gods of the childhood of European civilization were not entirely responsible for the production of the modern man, nor were they responsible for his morality since they themselves were immoral. The rise of man was rather directed by both sides, i.e., by both immortal and mortal gods, and man was thus treated on the one hand as a slave and as a master on the other. Man was not born "from a father," as the history of European civilization insists, but between two worlds. Man was born on the boundary between two equally powerful forces that were equally responsible for what he became. It is clear that if man became capable of laboring

not for himself but for "god," this was so only because someone else was laboring for him. But the point here is not the freedom that the lack of alienable labor gave man. The point is rather the fact that when someone else performs labor for us, we in a most essential sense become a *medium* that the care-taker can shape at will. In this sense, those who cannot take care of themselves may easily become an object of "spiritual intervention." This is the mechanism in the case of children that produces the essence of the process of socialization and explains why children come to share the ideals of their parents, or why the sense of guilt of our ancestors can be inherited. The world of the infant is the world of the care-taker with all its gods, mysteries, and divinities, and the latter is also the only world from which the satisfaction of their needs can arise. People are thus condemned for their entire lives to serve *goals and ideals* that in no way can be defined as individual goals, for they much more have the character of social goals and were "implanted" in their consciousness in early childhood. The *ego-ideal*, which psychoanalysis failed, not surprisingly, to articulate as an *individual agent*, is the only factor capable of being responsible for this.

Arendt found perhaps the most essential difference between work and labor to reside in their relations to instruments. As she notes, "the process of life that requires laboring is an endless activity and the only 'instrument' equal to it would have to be a *perpetuum mobile*, that is, the *instrumentum vocale* which is alive and 'active' as the living organism which it serves" (Arendt 1958, 122). Because nothing essential comes from the household other than the use of possessions, household instruments can never be replaced by the instruments of workmanship, from which a tangible product, i.e., something more than the mere use of instruments, results. Furthermore, tools and instruments are themselves "products of work" but never the products of labor since labor produces nothing durable, being in principle unproductive (Arendt 1958, 121).

It appears, however, that although Arendt attempts to provide functional grounds for the difference between the slave as a living instrument, or "perpetuum mobile," and the non-living instruments of workmanship, she in fact takes the point for granted and does not support it with proper argumentation. Why are slaves as superior instruments incapable of producing anything tangible while inferior, specialized tools and instruments add new value to the thing produced and, furthermore, produce durable things with a lasting value? Is it indeed the case that taking care of life adds nothing to the quality of life?

Sociology would disagree with this conclusion that follows from Arendt's analysis, which itself is constrained by the philosophical thought of the "fathers." Either slaves are instruments, as Aristotle claimed, and possess all the properties of instruments, which means that their labor "results in something more than the mere use of the instrument," or they are not even instruments but rather inferior beings with inferior

souls, whose labor is simpler or "cheaper" than that of the master and thus incapable of producing any value or leaving a material trace. Furthermore, since an instrument has always a function, how could the labor of the slave not result in anything other than appropriation, consumption, exhaustion, or regeneration, as Arendt claims? How could labor have made man?

What seems to be a shortcoming of Arendt's analysis is the absence of a distinction between labor for oneself and labor for another since, as history insists, it was the *labor of another* that made modern man, not the labor that one performs for oneself. In other words, when labor is performed for another, it is able to add a new quality and result in something more than "consumption." It is this which appears to be the secret of the process of human education and the process of socialization. Labor does not only produce life, it also produces the social being that is the prerequisite for any *social life*. Labor performed for another is the sole foundation of society, which is the human production and reproduction of the conditions for the existence of the public realm and work.

As Aristotle argued, ruling over people in a servile position is not the same as ruling over people "who are similar in birth to the ruler, and are similarly free" (Aristotle 1986, 1277b, §13). Ruling slaves who carry out menial tasks does not require the master "to know how to do," but "only to know how to use (the capacities of the ruled)," while ruling free men requires learning and a knowledge of both how to rule and how to obey the rules, or be ruled (Aristotle 1986, 1276, §11; 1277, §14). The "science" that the master of slaves must know "consists in the use of slaves: a master is such not by virtue of owing, but of using slaves." This "science" "has no great or majestic character: a master must simply know how to command what the slave must know how to do" (Aristotle 1986, 1255b, §4).¹⁰ The essence of this "science" is to know how to use objects in the environment, being they living beings or slaves, as instruments for the attainment of one's personal goals. We thus arrive at the concept of instrumental rationality as defined by Weber.¹¹

Although it is quite tempting here to distinguish *labor* from *work* on the basis of its *non-instrumental attitude towards life*, this hypothesis will be rejected since it only seems to be the case that labor performed for another cannot use another's

¹⁰This is a radical departure from Plato's concept, which Arendt follows, whereby only the master knows while the slave needs neither thought nor knowledge (Arendt 1958, 223). It is surprising that Arendt decided to rely on the Platonic project for eliminating the private character of the household community instead of taking into account Aristotle's criticism of Plato in the *Politics*.

¹¹Instrumental rationality as Weber defined it is an action in which the behavior of objects in the environment and other human beings "are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the actor's own rationality pursued and calculated ends." This also involves a "rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the relations of the end to the secondary consequences, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends" (Weber 1978, 24-26).

life as an instrument to attain one's own ends. The fact is that man is as much a master of any instrument that he uses as he is a slave to it because he becomes dependent on it and thus unfree. For this reason, man is an object of double intervention from, or "enslavement" to, both immortal and mortal gods (care-takers) in that both are equally responsible for man becoming what he is. The point is that while the one type of control, that over the human body and actions, has always been more visible, the other type of control, that over the human soul, has always remained more subtle and hidden.

As Aristotle put it, the "body" of the slave-master is identified with the household, and all members of the household are merely parts of his body that labor for the realization of their master's goals and the satisfaction of his needs. At the same time, however, the slave was the "soul" in the master's body. The slave thus loses his freedom because he is no longer a body, because his own body is the possession of another body, or has been transformed into a part that supposedly cannot exist by itself. In this sense, the superiority of the master is that he preserves his wholeness while the wholeness of the slave's body has been taken away from him. But it is equally legitimate to maintain that the body is a slave of the soul that defines in very subtle ways what the body's needs are.

Furthermore, we should not presume that the "slave," or the human being who labors for another, initially had a feeling of the wholeness of his body that he had to give up when enslaved. We should rather assume that he was in principle a human being who was socialized or conditioned in such a way that he had the consciousness of a part that was not yet a whole. What follows from this hypothesis is that slavery in ancient Greece was not the reason for the formation of what is often considered to be a "slavish consciousness." On the contrary, I wish to maintain that this type of consciousness existed even before slavery, and it only came to be designated or stigmatized as "slavish" when its peculiar quality was discovered and *put to use by an enterprising spirit*.

Within the context of the present work, "slavish consciousness" can be translated as just one of the forms in which the social consciousness of those prone to the shame-experience may be presented, while the "cowardice" that Aristotle considered to be the main distinctive feature of all slaves can also be interpreted as modesty, fear of loss of love, respect for the other, etc.¹² In other words, the hypothesis I wish to defend is that people with *social consciousness*, who were so conditioned in the process of socialization as to feel themselves parts of a collective whole, came to be designated in the history of European civilization as "slaves."

¹²As Arendt notes, Aristotle maintains that cowardice unmistakably reveals the slavish nature of a defeated enemy and his moral unworthiness and unfitness to be a citizen, for the latter would never prefer enslavement rather than death (Arendt 1958, 36).

In the light of the proceeding analysis of shame, the reasons for this are easy to discern. Such people with social consciousness, conditioned to fear the opinion of others and the loss of their love, are objects of external control, very easily controlled and manipulated from without. Stated otherwise, members of social units in which shame is used as the moral sanction of human behavior can easily be used as instruments for attaining another's goals. When the enterprising Greek spirit "discovered" the ease through which such people could be controlled and their labor used, the way to the emergence and development of European civilization was opened up.

It is surprising to discover that when the "political philosopher" Arendt drew her distinction between the "division of labor" and "specialization of work," she virtually repeated Durkheim's distinction between mechanic and organic solidarity. For Arendt, the division of labor "presupposes the qualitative equivalence of all single activities for which no special skill is required, and these activities have no end in themselves, but actually represent only certain amounts of labor power which are added together in a purely quantitative way." That is to say that the division of labor is distinguished by the fact that "two men can put their labor power together and 'behave toward each other as though they were one'" (Arendt 1958, 123). This type of "one-ness" is completely alien to work, which is rather based on cooperation and is "guided by the finished product itself whose nature it is to require different skills which then are pooled and organized together" (ibid.). What is lacking at this juncture in Arendt's discussion, however, is a special term that reflects the specific nature of work, which is not merely some higher stage in the process of the division of labor. The term needed here is in fact found in contemporary macro-sociological theory, namely, *functional differentiation*. In this respect, clearly distinguishing between labor and work leads to the clear articulation of one of the most important sociological differences, namely, that between the *division of labor* and *functional differentiation*. Indeed, the absence of a distinction between labor and work, and thus between the division of labor and functional differentiation, is common in even the most modern sociological writings.

If in our modern world of specialization labor still remains "invisible" and stigmatized, this is perhaps primarily because labor in principle, unlike work, *cannot* be differentiated into specialized sub-fields. This does not mean, however, that labor has no social function. It only means that labor is specialized in the performance of a function that must be taken care of as a whole and cannot be differentiated. Stated otherwise, *work is specialized in the production of functional parts* and *labor is specialized in the production and maintenance of functioning wholes*. That is not to say that labor requires no specialization while work does. The difference rather turns on specialization for the production of wholes (forms), on the one hand, and, on the other, specialization for the production of parts which themselves are incapable

of reproducing the whole. Labor cannot, therefore, be the basis of any organic solidarity in Durkheim's sense insofar as organic solidarity presupposes cooperation between people having different functions, none of whom has the pretension of being specialized in the function of the whole. Mechanical and organic solidarity, the division of labor and functional differentiation, are thus not alternatives but rather complement each other. This also means that the disappearance by virtue of the advance of organic solidarity of the *conscious collective* implied by mechanical solidarity is in principle impossible since this would mean a world incapable of reproducing itself.

An important consequence follows from the fact that Durkheim's *conscious collective*, or mechanic solidarity, is strongest in the simplest forms of society. When the qualitative equivalence of all labor is presupposed and all members of society are equally capable of serving a single undifferentiated social function, it is much easier for such a society to lose "parts" of its social organism without the social whole being destroyed. However, as human history has shown, this does not seem to be true in the long run. Societies that entertain unrestrained trust and rely only on the "conscience" of the other to preserve them when they themselves are unable to do so are first and foremost found in the book of "extinct species."¹³ Within the context of the present, we may call all such societies shame-cultures. If shame-culture cannot be seen today in its pure form, this is precisely because such peoples have become extinct. This has in turn made it seem as if Europeans are people without foundation, while one important half has always been missing from the history of European civilization.

In summary, labor is a type of specialization for the production of wholes that cannot be split into pieces or differentiated in order to be delegated to different "specialists," as the body of the Thracian god Dionysus was dismembered and devoured by the Titans. Labor is a relationship in which the whole body participates, not just one of its parts. From a sociological perspective, labor is an activity whose essence is to take care of living wholes, shape life without destroying it, and create new forms of life, but it is always concerned with nothing other than life. Work, on the other hand, is a different type of activity that requires *taking a distance from life*, i.e., it

¹³European civilization has recorded in its history the enigmatic fact of how a certain European people, who Herodotus claimed were the most numerous after the Indians, namely, the Thracians, came to be extinct. The Thracians disappeared from European civilization in the 5th century BC, after which time they were only ever again referred to as "the lost people." Taking this into account, we may come up with a suggestion much more plausible than that put forward by Freud concerning the origin of the *civilizational sense of guilt*. Individual psychology, as Durkheim claimed, can never suffice for the explanation of social phenomena, especially when they come to dominate the development of an entire civilization, such as European civilization has been overwhelmed by the inexplicable sense of guilt that Freud coded as the "Oedipus complex." Another coded name for the same event, which may well correspond to historical reality, is found in the Biblical story of how the low-land Cain killed his brother, the shepherd Abel.

requires the consciousness of a *user* who is capable of using life as an instrument that mediates the relationship between man and nature. But that which distinguishes the consciousness of the laborer from that of the worker is not his supposedly inferior, non-instrumental consciousness, but rather the particularity of his *instrumental consciousness*, whereby the laborer *uses life for the sake of life*, including social life. The laborer uses life to mediate the relationship between man and man, between people from the past and those from the future. Therefore, labor has life or the human being as its *medium* not for the production of things for consumption, but for the production and reproduction of *social life*.

5. Mother-Child versus Father-Child Relationships

It is obvious that the two sides of one and the same difference or relationship cannot be described with one and the same language, even when one uses the same words, because these sides belong to two different observation positions. What the ancient world lacked, however, can be found in the modern world when we turn to the field of cultural anthropology, and especially to the classical work of Kardiner on child development. From this modern perspective, children are not sweet little creatures who make our lives easier. They are *masters*, some more demanding and powerful than others, who at the moment of their birth require a slave or a *pedagogue*, not a teacher or supervisor.¹⁴ Interestingly enough, Kardiner saw the roots of *magic consciousness* in the first stage of the infant's development. It is grounded in the belief that needs are satisfied by virtue of magic or by virtue of the ubiquitous presence of the mother, who is always there to "reach any discomfort." On the basis of data from pathological states, Kardiner concluded that "the control over the environment exerted by the infant through the mother's agency is very like the one we subsequently observe in magic practices." In this initial period, which Kardiner called the "period of magic control through the mother," we cannot even "speak of the child's attitude of dependency." As Kardiner emphasized, when children "establish a relationship with some individual" during this "period of magic control," they "do not regard the other person as a separate entity, but as an appendage of themselves" (Kardiner 1947, 36). This period is also known in modern studies as a "symbiotic phase" in which the mother is nothing but "part-object" or "an *extension of the self*" (Mahler, Pine, Bergman 1975, 49, 95). Paradoxically enough, it is the child who should be granted a kind of inferior "instrumental rationality" rather than the care-taking person,

¹⁴Kardiner wrote in this respect that "psychoanalysis made the discovery that infants do not perceive their helplessness, but, on the contrary, feel as if they control the world. How does this come about? The helplessness of the child is conceded by the parent, aid is given unsolicited, and indications of discomfort are eagerly anticipated or sought out" (Kardiner 1947, 35).

whom the child apparently perceives as not very different from Aristotle's "talking animate instrument." Especially in the period where the fear of separation from the mother arises, the most typical behavior is "pulling mother's hand and using it as a tool to get a desired object or expecting that mother, summoned by some magical gesture alone, rather than with words, would guess and fulfill the toddler's momentary wish" (ibid., 95).

This is a strange stage that indicates an ego without boundaries, which in its pathological development and continuation throughout adult life is known as a "loss of ego boundaries" (Kardiner 1947, 36). This stage may never be overcome in pathological development such that those so affected become incapable of establishing a relationship that does not amount to a total suppression and possession of the other.

That the *mother-child type* is always the primary pattern of a child's relationships with others means that all care-takers, including the father, are initially subsumed under the heading of "mother," which stands for a person who satisfies needs, not for a person one can talk to. Modern studies of children's psychological development thus claim that their desire for expanded autonomy leads not only to negativism towards mother and others, but also to "an active extension of the mother-child world: *primarily, to include the father.*" Nevertheless, the father is a very different category of "love object" than the mother, and "Although he is not fully outside the symbiotic union, neither is he ever fully part of it" (Mahler, Pine, Bergman 1975, 91).

As the child grows and, together with this, his personal needs grow and become more specific, there also appears a need to invent new techniques for satisfying the primary needs because "the technique of magic control begins to fail" (Kardiner 1947, 36). In this regard, it follows from the hypothesis of magic control that the child, with the introduction of discipline, "ceases to control the mother, and it must submit to a situation in which very candidly the mother controls the child." Moreover, "it is at this point that the real discrepancy between parent and self becomes manifest to the child, when the desire for new experience, which adult activity constantly holds before his eyes, is constantly checked by his own inadequacies" (ibid., 43).

Kardiner connects this stage with the emergence of pain and frustration, but within the context of the present work the stage of dependency is the stage at which shame comes to play a major role. Thus, the feeling about the mother as an appendage of the child is gone, the initial unity of mother-child has been broken, and the separation is underway whereby the mother (or any care-taker) becomes another *Over I* from which the individual *I* has been already distanced. Insofar as love is no longer unconditionally granted, Freud's *fear of loss of love* appears in place of the certainty and trust in never-ending magic based on the love of the mother. In fact, the roles now are changed, whereby the mother and everything she stands for is the master, while the child is "the slave." Just as in the case of the mother, however, this "slave" is "a slave of love," and everything that the child does is in principle done not because

of some conscious goals or reason, but rather because obedience to external reason becomes the only way to secure another's love. The world in which the child was born is the world of love, and for such a child there is no other world. This is a single world without alternatives, not because there are no other worlds, but because the child has no access to any other social *medium* (such as money or power) than love.

The growing space opened up between the child and the mother comes to be filled with other love objects, who in the ideal case also stand for people upon whose love the child depends, not for people whose punishment he fears. Finally, through an encounter with a "significant other," the child breaks out of the helpless stage at which only the love of others makes the "magic" work. Needless to say, there are no "significant others" in the primary world of child's development that is organized by the mother-child relationship. The primary world is instead the world of the *significant child*.

We will, therefore, not hesitate to argue here that shame and guilt have different relationship referents. Nevertheless, the *father-child* relationship is not necessarily loaded with the guilt feeling, even though it is the *prototype* of this feeling; nor is the *mother-child* relationship necessarily found as subordinated to the experience of shame, although it is the corresponding *prototype*. Nor is this latter relationship necessarily a reference to the biological mother. It may well involve anyone who plays the role of a nurturing person, or care-taker, as distinguished from the "money-provider" or, more generally stated, the *provider of resources*. The point here is that these two feelings have different origins, and we cannot think of them as one feeling in two stages because they belong to different worlds, with different types of *construction work*, in which different languages may be spoken, none of which are naturally given to us.¹⁵ Most importantly, these worlds suggest different modes of perception and two *different types of consciousness*, only one of which seems to be sufficient for social life.¹⁶

¹⁵Heller wrote that shame "is the only inborn moral feeling in us" (Heller 1985, 6). But her position is not consistent insofar as she previously claimed that "(u)nlike fear, for instance, the shame affect cannot be conceived of prior to culture. In fact, shame and culture are coeval" (ibid., 5). The position accepted in the present text is that shame is not an inborn feeling, and that human nature with all its aspects needs cultivation if it is not to grow into a "civilized wilderness."

¹⁶Both Darwin and Tomkins describe cases which suggest that even certain underdeveloped abilities of speech and communication are sufficient for the emergence of social consciousness and, therefore, for the shame-experience. For example, Tomkins held that the non-verbalized feeling of shame can be found even at the earliest stage of pre-verbal and clearly empathic speech-acts, which can hardly be defined as communication. "Earliest speech," Tomkins wrote, "is an attempt to commune, to deepen experienced communion rather than an attempt to communicate, in the sense of expressing a personal message to the other. The aim of such imitation is to continue and to increase the homogeneity of the dyad" of child and mother (Tomkins 1995, 92).

Furthermore, it is legitimate to suggest that the enigmatic separation of the *ego-ideal* from the ego (or, as Freud put it, "the split of the ego") corresponds to the split of the initial unity with the mother, or the separation of the mother from the child, whereby, just as Freud conceived of it, the larger community assumed the place of the parent (the care-taker). In other words, the formation of the *ego-ideal* corresponds to Kardiner's transition from *magic control* to the discipline of the community life, where love is granted on conditions and becomes an object of uncertainty and frustration.¹⁷

Attention should also be drawn to the fact that when the psychologists today speak about *super-ego* development as having two stages, they apparently follow the Freudian model of the emergence of guilt. But when they assert that the beginning of *super-ego* development coincides with the stage of "fear of losing the object's love" (Mahler, Pine, Bergman 1975, 107), they fail to recognize the stage at which the *ego-ideal* is formed. The fact that "definite signs of internalization of parental demands" are discerned at the stage at which the child already experiences shame does not necessarily mean that the formation of the *super-ego* has also begun. It may well be an indication not simply of "the formation of *super-ego* precursors," as has often been assumed (Mahler, Pine, Bergman 1975, 109), but rather for the formation of another type of ego, namely, the *ego-ideal*. The interesting thing about this assumption is that it connects the enigmatic "super-ego precursor" with the *ego-ideal*, which is granted the status of yet another type of ego. In this sense it would be much more appropriate to call it the "ideal-ego." Certain problems connected with the distinction between *ego-ideal* and *super-ego* either come from or are reflected in the name of this other ego, which, as its present name implies, is nothing but an *attribute* of the ego. This decision of the "name-legislator" is all the more surprising in light of the fact that Freud himself, as we have seen, ascribed the function of moral censorship, and even "conscience," to both of them. In other words, shame and guilt not only overlap each other in time and space, but also have overlapping functions. This is a clear evidence that shame and guilt do not emerge simultaneously and do not belong to one and the same world. They rather belong to different worlds, even though they perform quite similar functions in these two worlds.

If individual development begins with the initial communion that is established with the mother, in which the experience of the mother's love and separation from

¹⁷ Arguing for the importance of the mother-child relationship, Tomkins obviously attempted to improve on the situation in classical psychoanalytic theory, which had not given it sufficient attention, and because of which shame remained an inferior "backstage-feeling." Tomkins thought that the latter was especially the case in respect to the theory of depression, which "suffered from the absence of the affect of shame," even though certain case-material clearly showed that "there was not only distress but also shame involved, as well as aggression as a secondary reaction to the suffering produced by an unfaithful love object" (Tomkins 1995, 225).

the mother create the need to be loved by others, then the individual is first *we* before becoming *I and me*. This also means that the feeling of being a member of a communion is prior to the feeling of being an autonomous individual with a separate "I." It only seems to be the case that adults break their relations with the magic world of their childhood once and for all. They, too, want to find the way back to this world, which gives priority to satisfying all their individual needs. As Tomkins notes, infants as well as adults have "learned sources of enjoyment" that "run quite as deep as those of infancy, and the adult whose positive affects have not also been engaged and invested in adult forms of communion is so much less an adult" (Tomkins 1995, 90).

If the *mother-child relationship* is the *prototype* of the relationship between ego and *ego-ideal* that is responsible for the feeling of shame, then *internalization* cannot be the only process that explains the entire complex development of the personality. The mother (or the care-taker), unlike the father (the resource-provider), does not need to be "internalized" insofar as she is originally an *alienable* appendage of the child's person. In other words, before any internalization can take place, the mother must first be "alienated," i.e., a split with the mother must take place in order to give rise to the stage at which a new authority can be internalized.

Shame is the *primary feeling* of the world from which the modern world emerged, and it therefore lies at the very *foundation of the human personality*, or is its source of humanity. It is an indispensable preparatory procedure for life in a world that one has to share with others. It is also the feeling of the *animal laborans* who labors for life as a part of life, who cares for life as a whole and not just for various of its "parts." While shame is the moral code of labor, guilt is the moral code of work. Guilt refers to the "upper floors" of the psychological construction, not least of all because a sufficiently long period of time is required to complete the process of separation from "mother-nature" and acquire instrumental attitudes and technical skills.

But the connection between the upper and lower "floors" of the psychic system is never completely broken, nor can guilt ever emerge as a separate feeling on its own without a foundation. The opposite, however, is not true, and we must be prepared to imagine that not all psychic constructions always have had, and necessarily have, "two floors." Therefore, it is shame which is a universal feeling while guilt is not, just as labor is universal while work is not.

The mother-child relationship can, of course, be discussed from a perspective other than that of the child, namely, the perspective of the mother. The symbiotic stage, when her "self" is enlarged and stretched beyond the limits of the body, is no less strange for her than it is for the child. But here again, the child is not internalized since it is a part of the self that, somehow, is located outside of it as a separate object of observation (self-observation?). This is something quite different from the "self-transcendence" and the internalization of completely alien objects that H. Lewis

had in mind. And this "part" may even never be completely externalized, as is the case with possessive mothers, who never grow up to the undeniable awareness of separation and struggle to prevent the process of the child's individuation by endlessly extending the stage of child-dependency.

However, this resembles a pathology only when viewed from the perspective of the modern world. From a non-biased observation position, a world in which separation from the mother and internalization of the father is the norm is no more legitimate than a world in which such separation never takes place and the mother remains the only moral authority. In this respect, we may speak about *matriarchal cultures* as the prototype of all "slave societies," of all societies entirely oriented towards satisfying the needs of life where there is no instrumentality. These are societies in which all that there is is *labor for life* and there is no *work for a better life*. But if we define such societies as matriarchal, we are, of course, using only one type of language and one perspective. Switching to the other side, we can also define such societies as societies of warriors, societies that resemble military camps, societies that are in a state of permanent war, or, if you prefer in a state of "permanent revolution." In such societies, mothers necessarily rule by virtue of their privileged position as "providers of magic," while the men make war.¹⁸ The point is that even modern societies can undergo an inconceivable change in the space of just a few months, lose their organization, and become societies of "slaves to labor" in which everyone labors for life and no one "works." Furthermore, this type of "sub-society" exists in any modern society. Life never stops, even in our modern world, and life must first exist if it is to eventually be made "better."

That is to say that the world of guilt, which presupposes the internalization of the father, or a demystified dialogical relationship between oneself and an objectified superior authority, is not without alternative. The legitimacy of either of these worlds, however, is not to be found in psychological and psychoanalytical theories.

6. Shame-Culture and Guilt-Culture

The Christian religion also shares the opinion that "at the beginning" was shame, not the fear of punishment or guilt. The Biblical story of the Garden of Eden conveys

¹⁸There is no doubt that war made ancient Greek society a slave society, and not any deliberate plan for a "better" social order. The lack of economic justification for this society has already been discussed in many works. More interestingly, however, the hypothesis presented above can be supported by the fact that the ideal slave in the ancient Greek world was female, while the men were killed. Finley thus wrote: "Slaves existed in number; they were property, disposable at will. Mostly, to be precise, there were slave women, for wars and rides were the main source of supply: there was little ground, economic or moral, for sparing and enslaving the defeated men" (Finley 1977, 54).

the idea that the paradise in which people initially lived was a "magic world" where all needs were satisfied as soon as they arose. In fact, these people were not even conscious of their dependence or their shame, nor were they aware of the fact that they were constantly being observed. They were as *innocent* as any children of nature are, i.e., lacking in knowledge or, in other words, *ignorant*. We might even say that the original sin of the innocents who lived in the paradise was their lack of any knowledge about either themselves or the world.

It is thus interesting from a sociological point of view to note that not only were knowledge and instrumental-rational actions absent from Paradise, but also self-knowledge and value-rational actions, such as picking an apple for the sake of knowledge and for no particular end, or satisfying a need, or improving the conditions of life. As soon as a value-rational action took place, people acquired the first knowledge of themselves and the painful process of separation from God began. And, as the Biblical story relates, the feeling of shame also appeared, shame before God-the-caretaker. To cope with this shame, the "children of nature" had to invent culture and leave the magic world of the paradise once and for all, taking the difficult road of never-ending labor where God's love was no longer unconditional and could not be taken for granted.

According to Heller, "in the case of the Old Testament we are apparently confronted with a 'shame culture', with moral judgement being the exclusive preserve of the external authority. This authority was embodied in the law of the community, formulated and commanded by the living God.... The Eye which disproved of one's actions, was not only the eye of others but above all the Eye of God. No one could hide from the living God" (Heller 1985, 9). As she further notes, there was no reciprocity: people were observed by a God whom they could not see. This reveals a world in which people had *the consciousness of being observed*, or social consciousness, while they did not have *the consciousness of observers* for they were not gods: The ability to observe requires yet another type of consciousness, namely, the consciousness of a subject able to see difference in a world of objects of which he does not feel himself to be a part. The consciousness of being observed, on the other hand, requires that one see the world as a world of sameness where what the individual fears and is able to observe is only his own difference.

It seems evident that the Christian religion is not merely a "collection of tales" about the "creation of man" made up by a superstitious mind, but rather a message with cognitive value, a symbolic interpretation of the history of the beginning, or of the emergence of conscious being. This impression is confirmed when we discover that the opinion of modern science does not contradict the main point in the Biblical story whereby the history of man began with shame. Classical scholars have also finally discovered an entire world dominated by the same feeling, making shame the feeling of the childhood of European civilization. The "childish" feeling of shame,

found in both individual and civilizational childhood, thus provides the first proof that there is a relation between individual and social development, and it also indicates that the repetition of phylogenesis in the ontogenesis of the species may have social relevance and significance.

Before being discovered as a pre-civilization feeling, shame was shown to be constitutive of the cultural foundations of certain European peoples to this very day, as well as peoples from other continents and civilizations. Yet the distinction between "shame-culture" and "guilt-culture" acquired enormous but relatively short-lived popularity when it first emerged some decades ago. While it was once taken to be the most "sensational discovery" of anthropology, influenced by neo-Freudian ideas, today the distinction between emotionally charged cultural types seems to have become more confusing than illuminating. However, the problems that this discussion encountered appear to have had nothing to do with the issue itself, but rather with the fact that the majority of questions opened up by this discussion happen to be the most fundamental and intractable problems in the social sciences and humanities. In this regard, the question is whether the modern social sciences have at their disposal all of the "tools" necessary for such cultural "excavations."

Ruth Benedict is considered to be the first anthropologist who was convinced of the utility and explanatory power of the distinction between shame-culture and guilt-culture. In her pioneering work *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (first published in 1946), which concerns the fundamental assumptions and view of life of the Japanese, she considered the anthropological distinction between cultures "which rely heavily on shame and those that rely on guilt as an important one" (Benedict 1989, 222).¹⁹ Indeed, the effort to articulate the difference between shame- and guilt-cultures, which by far does not exhaust the "sensational merits" of her book, has been responsible for the outstanding fame of both *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* and its author.

The distinction between shame-cultures and guilt-cultures is first of all provided in respect to the mechanisms of socio-psychological control that these cultures implement in the production of particular types of individuals. Thus, a man from a guilt-culture has an "internalized conviction of sin" precisely because he lives in a "society that inculcates absolute standards of morality and relies on men's developing a conscience." Shame-cultures, on the other hand, are those that "rely on external sanction for good behavior," whereby feeling comes "as a reaction to other people's criticism" (Benedict 1989, 222-23). Benedict also seems to be convinced that the

¹⁹The origin of the concepts *shame-culture* and *guilt-culture* cannot be traced with certainty. While some believe that Benedict borrowed the distinction from Margaret Mead (Peristiany, Pitt-Rivers 1992, 6), others believe that she found it in Erik Erikson (Lloyd-Jones 1991, 190), or that Margaret Mead and Benedict both took it from Freud (Heller 1985, 2). What is certain, however, is that Ruth Benedict's book played a key role as the "scientific carrier" of these terms.

two types of culture differ not in respect to the behavior which they sanction, but rather in respect to the way in which this is done insofar as that which gives rise to shame in the one culture gives rise to guilt in the other (ibid., 222).

A few of the characteristic differences that the observant eye of the anthropologist has discerned are of special interest. For example, a man from a shame-culture does not pray to the gods for the forgiveness of sins but for good luck. In principle, the mechanism of confession so prominent in a guilt-culture is apparently absent from shame-cultures, where confessing in front of a priest can make the feeling of shame even stronger. There is no relief for chagrin, embarrassment, or a sense of humiliation through confession or making one's fault a matter of public knowledge. In other words, while the Christian religion has discovered a cure for the suffering soul of the guilty man, it remains quite unable even to reduce the pains of a soul paralyzed by the feeling of shame, not to mention actually providing complete relief. This necessarily presents the shame-culture with a "halo" of *helpless fatalism*, whereby the "loss" of social status is irretrievable and nothing can be done to repair the damage once the individual has been unfortunate and his "bad behavior" made public knowledge.

In addition, an audience, be it real or imaginary, is necessary in order to feel shame, while guilt has no such need since the authority that sanctions behavior has been "internalized" (Benedict 1989, 223). That is to say that shame- and guilt-cultures apparently provide completely different constructions of the social space, which in the first case is organized around the relationship between the individual and an audience, while in the second society is comprised only of participants, of self-sufficient individuals with a moral conscience who have no need of a special audience of "watchers."

Because the member of a shame-culture apparently experiences a constant fear of visible or invisible observers, this particular fear keeps him not only in constant obedience to the rules established by public authority, but also in constant unfreedom. And if a man from a shame-culture decides, nevertheless, to struggle for freedom, he apparently has no choice but to try to remain as "equal" as he can possibly be in order to become "invisible."

Another moment that deserves special attention in Ruth Benedict's analysis concerns the relation between a given type of culture and its conception of virtue. For the Japanese, shame is apparently "the root of virtue," and only those people who know what shame is and are sensitive to it are considered to be "virtuous men" (Benedict 1989, 224). This is one of the main reasons why their virtues, as Benedict put it, "did not export well" in the modern world, where knowledge, individual integrity, and initiative are virtues, and where even children and young people are no longer especially prized for being modest or for caring too much about public judgement concerning their deeds.

It is not at all by chance that the term "shame-culture" appeared at the end of the Second World War, in which United States fought Japan. It could even be said that the term might never have been introduced into the social sciences if the war had not brought Western civilization into a direct confrontation with a most enigmatic enemy, whose confusing "otherness" represented a great challenge to traditional Western logic and reason.²⁰ In this respect, Ruth Benedict's main achievement should be seen in her intention to search for a meaning and discover an alternative *cultural pattern* behind the seemingly incidental and contradictory behavior of people who appeared to Westerners as inhabitants of not just another continent but almost of "another universe."

7. Homeric Shame-Culture

After the concept of shame-culture was first used as a guide to a world that lay beyond the extended space of modern Western civilization, an attempt was then made to utilize it as an explanatory framework that would provide a better understanding of the no less alien and incomprehensible social world that European civilization found in its pre-historical past. With the publication of E. R. Dodds' *The Greeks and the Irrational*, the term shame-culture entered the vocabulary of classical studies and produced a second wave of sensation.²¹ Here it was used to translate certain essential aspects of the social, religious, and emotional life of *Homeric man*, whose nature for quite some time had been a topic of heated discussion in classical scholarship.

One of the main problems that had surfaced in these discussions was not whether the Homeric poems could be regarded as documents recording moments from the life of a particular society, but rather how to identify the historical period to which they belonged and the historical society they described (Finley 1977, 144). As long as this question remained unanswered, the world of Odysseus could be no more than a poetic invention.

But with the work of Dodds, the world in which Homeric man lived began to materialize and lose its mythological dimension. The important function performed in this respect by the concept of "shame-culture" was that it gave a reason to his behavior, however inconsistent it might seem to modern man. By virtue of the

²⁰Ruth Benedict opens her study with the words: "The Japanese were the most alien enemy the United States had ever fought in an all-out struggle. In no other war with a major foe had it been necessary to take into account such exceedingly different habits of acting and thinking" (Benedict 1989, 1).

²¹Dodds' *The Greeks and the Irrational* first appeared in 1951. As Lloyd-Jones notes, this work was ignored for some years before becoming established as "the most influential application of post-Freudian psychology to the study of the ancient world" (Lloyd-Jones 1991, 188).

identification of the world in which he lived as a world with cultural specificity. Homeric man acquired not only *reality* and *identity*, but also *historicity*. He began to be viewed as the representative of an integral whole, of a special social unit that had its place on the temporal scale of the progressing civilization as its *cultural substrate*. In other words, the application of the psychoanalytical perspective to the study of ancient history opened up an historical horizon that was previously fixed and made it possible to ascribe a form to yet another important "beginning."²²

The main purpose of Dodds analysis of Homeric culture, as he himself declares, is to show that "behind the term 'Homeric religion' there lies something more than an artificial machinery of serio-comic gods and goddesses" (Dodds 1951, 18). Man in the times Homer depicted was neither self-oriented and concerned about the absolute evaluation of his deeds as beneficial or harmful for him, nor was he concerned about the "impression" that his actions would produce in the eyes of a deity (ibid., 26). In the place of the fear of gods, Dodds put forward the "respect for the public opinion" that he had discovered as "the strongest moral force which Homeric man knows" (ibid., 18).²³

Life in the world of Homer meant a constant fear of "loss of face," whereby every exposure to contempt or ridicule at the hands of the other led to a loss of self-control and psychological crisis. The sanction of shame (*aidos*) was public disapproval (*nemesis*). Dodds claimed that the impulsiveness of Homeric man came from the fact that he was socially conditioned to believe in "psychic intervention," as well as from a lack of the social conditioning needed for the emergence of a personal will. But instead of seeing the "rapid and violent changes of mood" of Homeric man as a sign of "mental instability," as others did, Dodds explained his impulsiveness as a result of the confrontation between individual impulse and the pressure of social conformity (Dodds 1951, 18). And if the acts of these ancient ancestors of ours seemed to be non-rational, unsystematized, and somehow "excluded from the self" and ascribed to an alien origin, the reason was that "the acts in question are such as to cause acute shame to their author" (ibid., 17).

But perhaps the most interesting of Dodds' claim is that, beginning with the Archaic Age that followed the Dark Age of Homer, there was a dramatic change in the religious

²²"It is true," Finley wrote, "that European civilization began with the Greeks, it is equally true that Greek history began with the world of Odysseus. And, like all human beginnings, it had a long history behind it. For history, as Jacob Burckhardt remarked, is the one field of study in which one cannot begin at the beginning" (Finley 1977, 25).

²³The preferred "definition-minimum" of classical scholars for shame-culture, which allows them to agree upon the basic essence of Homeric culture, stresses the fact that its "sanction is overtly 'what people will say.'" Since the shame-experience is always accompanied by serious practical consequences, it was even suggested that "it is not merely a shame-culture, but also and more fundamentally a 'results-culture'" (Adkins 1972, 12, 138).

attitudes of ancient man that had almost been completed by the fifth century BC. The essence of this change can be expressed in terms of a transition from shame-culture to guilt-culture, which, however, is not bound to any theory of cultural change. Neither are there convincing explanations for the transition itself and the mysterious historical forces that acted to produce it. There are certain plausible guesses, such as the coming of a "time of extreme personal insecurity," economic crisis, "murderous class warfare," or some enigmatic changes in the family, especially in the relationships between fathers and sons (Dodds 1951, 46-47). This growing tension between fathers and sons was also apparently related to those changes in the education of youth in which the rise of the Sophistic movement, which ultimately led to the introduction of the new Socratic, or Platonic, criteria for virtue, had its share.

Dodds' comparison between, on the one hand, early epic Homeric poetry, in which a concept of ritual pollution and the guilt feeling corresponding to it are absent, and, on the other, fifth century Greek tragedy, in which they dominate, can hardly be dismissed even by the more resentful opponents. This question, however, does not seem to be of the type for which history or archeology by themselves may "discover" the answer.

Certain philosophers have argued that even though the difference between shame- and guilt-cultures can be neither proved or disproved historically, its legitimacy is nevertheless confirmed on psychological grounds. Since shame and guilt exhibit real *psychological differences*, and since the existence of these two words is not some mere "verbal redundancy" whereby there might be different verbal markers for one and the same psychological field, the contrast between Homeric society and our modern world remains essential (Williams 1993, 89).

The majority of classical scholars now seem convinced that the distinction between shame- and guilt-cultures is important, but insofar as both attitudes and cultures are found in Greece, the latter may be a poor example by which to illustrate it. At the same time, our modern world is no better in this respect.²⁴ There are studies which claim that it is relatively "easy to tell whether a given culture must be considered in general sense a guilt-culture or a shame-culture."²⁵ Nevertheless, even the supporters

²⁴Lloyd-Jones cites certain authors in this respect, including Sir Kenneth Dover, who sees the difference "more in the way people talk than in the way people feel; if 'guilt' means 'fear of the gods' and 'shame' 'fear of the hostility and ridicule of other people', Greek culture contained both elements, and so does ours" (Lloyd-Jones 1991, 191). Lloyd-Jones considers as reliable Geoffrey Gorer's (*The Dangers of Equality* 1966) definition of the difference between shame- and guilt-culture, which is provided in respect to "the predominance of one or another mechanism of internal or social control, the mechanism by which people regulate their own conduct which transgresses the norm prevalent in a given society in a given period" (Lloyd-Jones 1971, 171).

²⁵Lloyd-Jones thus claimed that we may say without hesitation that "the countries around the eastern Mediterranean which were formerly under Turkish rule and also those of China and Japan are shame-

of this distinction are quite cautious when speaking about it in more than relative terms. The problem persists because shame-culture was apparently not simply superseded by guilt-culture, but rather absorbed by it. This point underlies the claim that it is impossible "to point to a specimen of either type which is totally without an admixture of the other," and that it is even highly improbable that one of these types in its "pure form" exists today anywhere in the world (Lloyd-Jones 1971, 26; Lloyd-Jones 1987, 1; Lloyd-Jones 1991, 190).

But insisting that the elements of shame- and guilt-cultures are inseparable such that even an "argument of a general nature" is considered to be sufficient to support the point (Lloyd-Jones 1971, 26) constitutes a complete withdrawal from the positions that Dodds won for his science.²⁶ Stating that shame and guilt have been interwoven from the very beginning, supposedly evidenced by the fact that even today they continue to exist in such "symbiosis," is tantamount to rejecting the very revolutionary moment in Dodds' work concerning social evolution. Dodds' work may not be backed up by a theory of social change, but it definitely points in this direction. The difference between the claim that "everything started with a shame-culture" and the claim that "everything started with everything" resides in the fact the former has a point from which one can proceed further, while the latter does not.

One of the problems with interpreting the world that Homer describes is that his glance is fixed on the hero, who himself is the product of shame-culture and not its promoter. There is apparently a strange disregard in this respect of one sociologically important question, namely, that shame-culture cannot and should not be understood as the culture of wandering heroes who have nothing to do with any settled life. Shame-culture could not be born on the road to or back from Troy, as might appear to be the case, nor in the process of interaction between heroes whose bonds with their places of birth were severed. The world of heroes is incapable of reproducing itself, the heroes have no "pupils." In other words, the Homeric heroes were people with severed social bonds, as Scheff might put it.

As Finley noted, "the society which unfolds in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is one of kings and nobles, who possessed much land and many flocks and lived a life of splendor and fighting." The image of those people whose opinion the hero fears is not to be found. What is missing from that society is not only the mass of people who do not

cultures, while those of the United States, England, and other countries where Protestantism is or has been strong are guilt-cultures" (Lloyd-Jones 1971, 25).

²⁶Williams notes in criticizing this position that although the Greek word *aidos* "cannot merely mean 'shame', but must cover something like guilt as well," it would be wrong to deny the possibility that Greek societies can be adequately described in terms of shame-culture. "Even though some reactions in those societies were structured in the same way as our reactions of guilt, they were not simply guilt if they were not separately recognized as such; just as shame is not the same when it does not have guilt as a contrast" (Williams 1993, 90-91).

join the fighting, which was "restricted to individual combat among the heavy-armed nobles on both sides" (Finley 1963, 8-9). What is also missing is the culture that produced the hero, about which we can only infer from the behavior of its outstanding and unique "products." On the other hand, is also clear that that world could not reproduce itself without the hero because, in the absence of mediation, the two worlds of gods and mortals would then have fall completely apart.²⁷

But Finley discovered perhaps one of the most essential features of the Homeric world from a sociological point of view, namely, that the Homeric world was a gift-giving culture. It is surprising that a classical scholar such as Finley, and not an anthropologist, first came to note that "the gift-giving in Homeric poems is consistent" and, furthermore, that it is "absolutely consistent with the analysis made by Mauss" (Finley thus not only took Mauss' work more seriously than most sociologists did, he was also the first to criticize Mauss for "curiously" ignoring the analysis of ancient Greek culture in his study (Finley 1977, 145). It is ironic that Finley himself should be reproached for not having paid attention in his sociological work to the fact that Thucydides described the customs of the Odrisian state of the Thracians as typically gift-giving. But this "detail" that Finley neglected to note in his introduction to *The Peloponnesian War* actually makes Thucydides a distant forerunner of Mauss.²⁸ What further attracts attention is the fact that the gift-giving customs typical of shame-culture are immediately related to the "law of hospitality" that has been discovered to be so typical of the countries from the circum Mediterranean, which anthropologists have studied although their sociological meaning remains enigmatic. According

²⁷It has been observed that there are many similarities between Odysseus and Hermes, the messenger of the gods. For example, they both were masters of many arts (*techné*), including lying and deception, on the basis of their practical knowledge, ability to turn many ways, their experience as travelers, etc. This has been responsible for their being designated in the archaic hexameter by the epithets *polymetis* and *polytropos* (Pratt 1993, 65-68). The parallel can be extended even further if we consider the similar function that both play, i.e., to unite two worlds that otherwise would never be able to establish a relation with each other. But while Hermes "works for the gods," Odysseus rather "works for the people" (*demiergos*), just like a traveling bard whom one invites into one's home (ibid., 68). The latter is presented in the *Odyssey* as a master of his craft, which is a unity of *techné* and *sophia*. The gods need Hermes in the same way in which mortals need Odysseus.

²⁸Indeed here, Thucydides wrote, "and among the other Thracians too, the established custom was just the opposite of what it is in the kingdom of Persia; it was to receive rather than to give, and it was considered more of a disgrace to fail to give a present when one was asked for it than to fail to obtain a present when one asked for it oneself. And such was the power of the Odrisians that this custom was particularly prevalent among them, since it was quite impossible to get anything done unless one first produces a present" (Thucydides 1972, II, 97). One cannot help but notice the perplexity of this law. We may wonder how and why such a clear thinker as Thucydides allowed himself to be so inconsistent. Or rather, what did Thucydides want to say? What kind of message did he want to transmit to the future concerning such an "unimportant" people, of whom no traces are left in the history of European civilization, from whom European civilization has been happy to dissociate itself in time and space?

to this law, it is a shame not to give *the best* you have to the guest, even if nothing will be left for yourself.²⁹

If classical scholars have continued their interest in the discussions concerning shame and guilt, they apparently have done so more out of consideration for what their "neighbors" are doing than for the internal dynamics of their research field. More concretely, classical scholars continue to fix their glance on Homeric man and his times in resonance with the "third wave of sensation" produced by anthropology, which discovered that one can find certain "islands" even on the map of modern Europe where traditional shame-culture has been preserved, locations that have never actually succeeded in becoming modern. The discovery of the so-called "Mediterranean context" was a genuine surprise for the modern world, which was unaware of the possibility that it might contain within itself some part of that from which it was once differentiated. It can be argued that when anthropologists from the twentieth century looked at the societies in Southern Europe, they actually saw reflections of the childhood of European civilization.

Since the works of Pitt-Rivers and Peristiany (1965), the so-called 'Mediterranean societies,' even though the region still remains geographically undefined and should obviously include the countries situated on the former Thracian lands of the Balkans, have begun to be perceived as a cultural unity based on a special value system that gravitates around the complementary codes of honor and shame. These studies show that in these societies, where female modesty became a "capital good" and a "pseudo-

²⁹An interesting hypothesis emerges in this respect when the logic of the "law of hospitality" typical of shame-cultures is fully appreciated. Studies in Thracology have suggested that the Thracians did not know the value of money, and that the gold which they possessed in quantity had a thoroughly ritual value. Yet Herodotus repeats the ridiculous story that the Thracians sold their children to foreigners, a report that generated a millennia-long sense of repugnance that served to justify the negative attitude of all Greeks towards these illiterate barbarians. However, the Greeks did not enjoy access to the rich Thracian gold mines because they were more "powerful" than the Thracians, but rather because the Thracians themselves were not interested in them. Stated otherwise, the Greeks profited from the "law of hospitality," and "gold fever" was a Greek and not a Thracian "disease." What Herodotus reported therefore deserved the righteous indignation of Thucydides, who could not, however, mention the cause of his anger. He could only mention the principle that explained the Thracians' behavior, namely, the custom of gift-giving, which stands out in the middle of his as having nothing to do with the rest of his history. According to this custom, if someone brings you an expensive foreign present, you yourself must give him the most precious thing you have, which, in the absence of anything else, could be your most beautiful and beloved child. When we read this perplexing passage from Thucydides as a response to Herodotus' remark about the Thracians selling their children, it thus acquires perfect sense: The Thracians did not sell their children; neither gold, nor a few kilos of olives would be enough to buy you a beautiful Thracian slave. They rather gave them away to foreigners because they could not refuse a present when given one ("it was to receive rather than to give"). And when the Thracians received foreign presents, they could not but give in return their most dear "possession," fearing to break the custom of shame-culture, or fearing the loss of love of their countrymen ("it was considered more of a disgrace to fail to give a present when one was asked for it than to fail to obtain a present when one asked for it oneself").

commodity," the emphasis is on female "labor" and *reproduction* rather than on *production*, an issue that closes women into the private world that men try to avoid. In a work which, as David Gilmore put it, presents a panoramic approach, Mediterranean peoples came to be characterized as "more acted upon than acting," whereby causal priority is delegated to external stimuli (Gilmore 1987, 8). The study of these cultures is not yet completed, insofar as a host of extremely intriguing questions remain for which anthropology alone cannot provide answers. And the question that "freezes" enthusiasm more than all others and makes interest withdraw comes on the voice of skeptical instrumental reason: To which end may this knowledge serve as a means?

Studies of these issues have entered a vicious circle, just as in the case of classical science, which it seems only the intervention of sociology can break. Although the historian feels "unfree" in his interpretations of such matters by virtue of being limited by the paucity and unreliability of information at his disposal, what really makes him feel constrained is the lack of a theoretical framework for interpreting the phenomena he describes. And the problem is that anthropology, to which he looks for help, is also bound by the same constraints, being cut off from sociology and its most modern theoretical conceptions, as if anything of importance could ever be discovered as true for the social world without sociology pronouncing its "verdict." And here lies a unique opportunity for sociology to finally prove the potential power of her much criticized scientific language and enigmatic theoretical conceptions to ascribe meaning and provide scientific status to what will otherwise always be in danger of being perceived as no more than "a collection of travelers' tales," to use Giddens' words (Giddens 1990, 249-50).

Not only archeology, but also history and even anthropology must realize the fact that they cannot produce any truth about the social world by themselves.³⁰ The most they can do is to produce their own "pieces of the truth puzzle" that eventually will have to be joined together with the others in order to resolve the theoretical issue of social evolution. Otherwise, even if all scholars finally agree unequivocally concerning the nature of shame-culture and its historical prototypes, the question "where do we go from there" will always remain, and there will always be "a big 'so what' lurking about in the midst of all that needs consideration" (Gilmore 1987, 17).

³⁰When Finley claimed that archeology cannot produce answers because it can neither confirm nor falsify its multiple interpretations of one and the same discovery, he was primarily referring to the impossibility of relying on poetic and oral traditions as historical documents (Finley 1977, 176). Today it is clear, however, that the historical documents available from even such an enlightened period as classical antiquity do not lead directly to "the truth." The words in these documents are no less enigmatic than any given archeological object, and while their meaning is supposed to be derived from the context, the latter is never explicitly given and itself remains an object of interpretation.

It is not the case that most questions in this regard that still remain unanswered are unanswerable in principle, but rather that they have not yet been addressed by the science that may have the means necessary to resolve them. The question is not whether shame-culture has ever existed in pure form, whether it was "devoured" by guilt-culture, or whether it still exists somewhere in our modern society in a "disguised form." The question is rather where to look for it. What is the level, if not the society itself, where shame-cultures can be studied in "pure" forms? In which "corners" of the world should we search for them? At which stage of the development of society as a system can we find them? If we have no clear and consistent theoretical conception of what society really is, we are hardly able to put forward sound claims concerning the genealogical relations among those cultural types that lie at its foundation.

8. What Did the Civilizational Childhood Lack?

There is almost complete agreement among classical scholars that Homeric man lacked "something," but they do not seem to have reached any agreement as to what that actually was. The following brief presentation of the main themes of discussion in this regard serves to show how confused the social sciences' conceptual "arsenal" has become and how little scholars understand each other. Even when they work in one and the same discipline, many of them are obviously using different "languages."

One main question that still has no clear answer is whether the world of Homeric man should be regarded as a world of action. Indeed, hardly an author can be found who does not agree that Homeric man was a subject of "divine intervention" and that there was something "robot-like" about him. As Jaeger notes, Homer does not "see every action from within, as a phenomenon of human consciousness," because "in his world, nothing great happens without the aid of a divine power," and all human actions are "guided by the gods" (Jaeger 1946, 51). Because he was "impelled for wrongdoing by external forces too strong for him to resist," he could not have even committed any sin (Dover 1974, 153). But how can we speak about actions if human consciousness is not entirely responsible for them, and if all human deeds are guided "from above?" If such were the case, people could have no free will.

It has been noticed in this respect that "there is something peculiar about the Homeric notion of deliberation and action," namely, the absence of something called "will" and "intention," with which every theory of action is concerned (Williams 1993, 29, 33). The discussion thereby acquired a new focus, in respect to which analysis of the foundations of Greek moral philosophy demonstrated that "the concept of will has no place in its ideas." This conclusion was also justified by the fact that the English verb and noun "to will" and "will" cannot be translated into Greek unless

other words are used that have a much broader scope of meaning (such as "wish," "desire," "intend," etc.) (Dihle 1982, 37).

Some scholars, however, were of the opinion that it hardly could be justified that the Greeks were in general "blind to the existence of a distinct factor in thought and action which we call 'will.'" All that could be claimed is that they found the distinction of such an "ingredient" in "the directional aspect of thought and action" to be unnecessary (Dover 1974, 151). Or, stated otherwise, the fact that Homer lacked the quite sophisticated concept of *will* tells us very little because Homer was nevertheless able to describe a decision (Lloyd-Jones 1971, 9). Some, like Snell, argued that Homer also had no word for an act of choice or decision. But Homer's characters cannot be deprived of the ability to make decisions and of the concurrent responsibility since the *Iliad* could not be a poem dealing with great moral issues if such were the case (ibid.). Men might take wrong decisions if their "passions have been set in motion by the action of a god," but "when a human action, whether right or wrong, is put down to the action of a god, that does not mean that the human actor is not held responsible for his decision." Thus, every "divinely motivated act" is also considered as "fully motivated in human terms," whereby "the part played by the god can always be subtracted without making nonsense of the action" (ibid., 10). The problem is, however, that *aidos* (shame and reverence) is considered to be one of the main impediments to action, which must be removed in order to open up "the road to a good or evil deed" (Dihle 1982, 22-23).³¹ Furthermore, neither the "action," nor the decision appear to be results of interaction, if not between men, then at least between gods and mortals.³²

Homeric man may have had a will, but since his will was "shaped" by the will of the gods, he cannot be considered a "moral agent." He makes choices and has personal intentions and plans, but insofar as they are realizations of the "divine plan," his actions could never be altered. Dodds thus argued that what Homeric man lacked was not simply "consciousness of personal freedom and of deciding for himself," nor a *will*, as Snell maintained, but a "*free-will*" (Dodds 1951, 20). If only the gods were free and directed the course of events, even when all of them were constituted

³¹Dihle notes that "*aidos* can be defined as a collective and prospective conscience which persuades man to apply the moral standards of his society to a situation where he has to act. In this capacity, *aidos* may turn out, in many cases, to be the principle obstacle for any action whatsoever, since it makes a man aware and, perhaps, afraid of the ensuing reactions to his deed and of other discomforts that may possibly result from it. So *aidos* may prevent him from acting at all, despite his being obliged to do something, because it can offer appealing excuses for him to stay inactive and supports the indolence and timidity of human nature" (Dihle 1982, 23-24).

³²Achilles thus complains in the *Iliad* about the lack of reciprocity in relations between the gods and men, and tells Athene that "it will be better if any man obeys the gods, they listen to him also" (as quoted in Williams 1993, 30).

of human thoughts, words, and acts, then we have to attribute to them not only all success, but also all actions.³³ In addition, all reason was attributed to the gods alone. Yet it was claimed that although it was god who gave man reason, "when the agent decides for those reasons and acts on them, he acts on his own reasons" (Williams 1993, 31).

Other inquiries into the nature of what the Greeks of the early archaic period lacked led to the notion of *personality*. Whatever personality they might have had, it was supposed to be without *unity* in view of the imperfect notion of it found in Homer. However, insofar as there is no difficulty in translating "I wish" or "I thought" into Greek, Dover has argued that "any statement to the effect that the early Greeks had no notion of the unity of the personality would be adequately refuted" (Dover 1974, 151).

Relevant to this point is the question of the famous ancient self-less-ness, love for the other or *philanthropia*, which even in the time of Plato and Aristotle was no longer considered to be an important virtue. If the Homeric type of personality was centered around the love of one's fellow man and the idea of unselfishness rather than self-interest, then it does not seem to fit into our modern conception of personality. The question is then not whether Homeric man had a personality and whether this personality had a unity, but rather what type of personality he had and what its structure was.

In addition, hardly any concept of *self* or soul (*psyche*) can be found before the time of Plato. This has led certain authors, such as Snell, to maintain that the very important dualistic distinction between soul and body did not exist in Homeric times (Williams 1993, 25). Snell even claimed that we cannot say that Homeric man was aware of his body in the way modern people are since Homeric man did not perceive it to be a unit and "did not know it *qua* body, but merely as a sum total of limbs," or "an assemblage of parts." Williams proclaimed this idea to be "a systematic failure" presented in "unhappy formulations" and instead suggested that when Snell failed to find the "whole" he was searching for, he "overlooked the whole that they, and we, and all human beings have recognized, the living person himself" (ibid., 24-25). But Williams himself apparently uses the term "person" as a substitute for "human being," which, at least in philosophy and sociology, it is not. He thus seems to have corrected Snell's mistake in his effort to dismiss the legitimacy of the latter's claims and found the proper term that should be used here, namely, "person."

One thing that Homeric man surely was not is a "person," and he was not aware of himself as a person. Perhaps what Snell actually had in mind was not simply "body" but *person*, i.e., something which represents the idea of the individual as a whole.

³³Dover, for example, relying on Demosthenes, mentions the existence of a "pious convention of attributing success primarily to the gods and in the second place to human agency" (Dover 1974, 135).

The concept of *person* involves certain of those aspects that have been discussed separately as absent from the characterization of Homeric man. This becomes especially clear when we take into account the concept of person with its more sociological meaning as "a being who can be addressed, and who can reply," as well as its philosophical meaning as "a being who has a sense of self, has a notion of the future and the past, can hold values, make choices; in short, can adapt life-plans." Most importantly, to be an "agent" and to be a person are not one and the same thing. One can be an agent because "things matter for him," which for Taylor is the necessary condition for the experience of shame, and yet one may not be a person in that he has no "power to plan" (Ch. Taylor 1985, 97-105). In other words, there are sufficient grounds to maintain that Homeric man was not yet a *person* even when he was a hero.

Williams, apparently a great master of irony, should also be credited for "discovering" yet another important qualification of Homeric man, once again in his efforts to interpret Snell's words in such a way that they look absurd. As a result, a very appropriate metaphor emerged that described Homeric man as "the Invisible Man," which he in fact was from a sociological point of view.³⁴ What Homeric man, or any member of a shame-culture, lacks can be discussed precisely in terms of "visibility."

Perhaps most paradoxical of all was the claim that Homeric man lacked *consciousness* and instead had *hallucinations*. Philosophers faced no great difficulty in countering this position. They asked how men who lacked consciousness could even have hallucinations in order to be "pushed about like robots" by powerful gods, who themselves were mere "hallucinations" (Williams 1993, 176). Of course, the question is not whether a member of a shame-culture had consciousness, but rather what *type of consciousness* he had.

Reading classical scholars on this question leaves us without any definite answer. For example, Jaeger held that the consciousness of Homeric man was entirely subordinated to the idea of honor, which is not only a fear of being shamed, but also a struggle for respect. Because he lived for honor, the sources of which were public praise and blame, his consciousness was "entirely public," and he lacked the "personal consciousness" typical for modern times.³⁵ It is clear that one who fears shame and whose moral code is *modesty* can have no personal consciousness, which requires

³⁴Williams writes in criticizing Snell that: "These unhappy formulations do play some role in the argument: they encourage the idea that since the body did not exist for Homeric man, a space is left where it should have been, and unless Homeric man was the Invisible Man, this space must have been filled by something, and that what it was filled by was the set of parts" (Williams 1993, 25).

³⁵Nowadays we must find it difficult to imagine how entirely *public* was the conscience of a Greek. (In fact, the early Greeks never conceived anything like the personal consciousness of modern times)" (Jaeger 1946, 9).

self-evaluation and a disregard of others' opinions about oneself. Furthermore, if Homeric man was not a *person* in the strict scientific meaning of the term, then in principle he could have no *personal consciousness*. But how could someone who had no *personal consciousness* have *public consciousness*, especially when we take into account the fact that the public realm emerged at a much later date?

It is one thing to say that these men struggled for social recognition, or honor, but quite another to say that they had *public consciousness*. From the point of view of the modern Christian world, such a struggle for self-advancement may appear to be a "sinful vanity," as Jaeger puts it. But he also notes that the Greeks "believed such ambition to be the aspiration of the individual towards that ideal and supra-personal sphere in which alone he can have real value" (Jaeger 1946, 9). Homeric man apparently had no sense of responsibility, no sense of guilt, and, furthermore, no *super-ego*, but he was nevertheless not immoral. His behavior was morally constrained, he feared sanctions and blame, and he struggled to attain "moral ideals" that were human ideals, not ideals imposed by the immoral gods. Stated otherwise, we have all necessary grounds to conclude that Homeric man had an *ego-ideal*, which in turn makes it possible to speak about the particular structure of his personality much before any "significant others" might emerge and be internalized.

Another essential point concerns the enigmatic reasons why the hero struggles for fame, something that is apparently different from the effort to avoid shame. In light of the position put forward in the present text, I wish to suggest that Homeric man's struggle for *public recognition* paradoxically coincides with *the road to freedom*. For an average member of a shame-culture, which promotes conformity, sameness, or non-difference, becoming a *hero* meant no less than being granted the right to be different, to be exalted above all others, to be distinguished from the rest of the people, and, therefore, to become *visible*. The hero thus struggled for a *face* in a world comprised of a faceless mass of "invisible" people. Only one who is "the same" has the consciousness of being observed, not the one who is different. Therefore, Homer's poetry does not assert the "fundamental fact that all culture starts with the creation of an aristocratic ideal," as Jaeger believed (Jaeger 1946, 57). It rather asserts the fundamental sociological fact that all cultural development is steered by man's constant struggle for freedom, for escape from unfavorable conditions, for an improvement in the conditions of life. In this sense, the hero is the rebel who fights for fame and recognition in order to be no longer the same, in order to be different. It is this which leads to the acquisition of personal consciousness and, eventually, to the formation of public, or representative, consciousness.

From the viewpoint of a modern observer, Homeric man had something of the quality of "invisibility" in much the same way as did the members of the *Greek tragic*

chorus, who had neither masks nor roles and were invisible to the actors on stage.³⁶ Furthermore, while he neither belonged entirely to the world of mortals, nor was a part of the world of the immortal gods, he feared the sanctions of both. The hero's physical presence in the world, or his life, was in the hands of gods, while his social presence, or his *social life*, was in the hands of mortals. In a sociological sense, he had no *body* to lose. He only had a *face to lose*, which for him meant losing his only place in the world, namely, the home that was the end point of his journey through the world. The regular member of a shame-culture, concerning whom Homer never bothered to engage our attention, had less to fear than the hero because he already had a home.

The criticism of what Williams labeled the "progressivist outlook," which fosters an analogy between the ontological development of the individual and that of civilization, is sociologically unconvincing. The problem with the analogy to individual moral development that renders Homer's characters *childish* does not seem to reside in the analogy itself, as Williams suggests. The problem is rather that this analogy was not carried further onto the ground of sociology, where the most important of the issues discussed above belong. Indeed, perhaps this analogy has greater potential than any of the existing philosophical theories to provide some guidance into the no less confused discussion of the shame feeling.

In order to put some order into the terminological hodgepodge produced by the interaction of different disciplines and different specialized languages, it is necessary to provide certain sociological distinctions. Perhaps the most important of these are the distinctions between "social" and "public consciousness" and "individual" and "personal consciousness." As was discussed above, even children cannot be said to have no *social consciousness*, but they do not have *public consciousness*. *Social consciousness* is universal, and all human beings capable of human interaction are social beings and have social life. *Public consciousness*, however, is not universal, and not all human beings have *public life* or work for the public. Public consciousness is *representative consciousness* insofar as the individual does not "present" himself but rather represents a particular group of people with particular interests. The formation of *public consciousness* requires the existence of a *public realm*, or a "stage," where action takes place, and where people with a consciousness of themselves as *persons* (*personal consciousness*) belong to one or another *interaction parties* and play social roles or act. In this sense, not every individual consciousness is personal

³⁶Commenting on a puzzling passage from *Lysistrata*, Sommerstein remarks that no notice was given to the presence of the chorus when the opposite should have been the case. This confirms his previously expressed opinion that "in Old Comedy the presence of the chorus could by convention be ignored so long as attention was not explicitly drawn to it by word or action." This impression is also strengthened by the discovery that at one point in the play the members of the chorus were supposed to be naked while none of those present on stage could be (Sommerstein 1990, 907).

consciousness, although it may be social consciousness, and there are individuals who have neither. The type of consciousness depends on the process of socialization, on the culture in which one is socialized. In this sense, social consciousness is more "primitive" than personal consciousness since it is basic human consciousness.

The formation of *personal consciousness* requires a more complex process of socialization and a more complex type of society. But not all persons from a modern society who have a modern personal consciousness necessarily have *public consciousness* since they may be completely disinterested in or excluded from participation in public life. Personal consciousness may remain quite private.

Durkheim defined *collective consciousness* as typical for the society with mechanical solidarity, in which "social conduct is controlled by shared values and beliefs: the collective dominates the individual, and there is only a rudimentary development of individual self-consciousness" (Giddens 1980, 25). Most importantly, "conscience collective" is most coherent and strong in the simplest forms of society" (*ibid.*). However, such consciousness seems to be counterproductive in a complex society with functional differentiation, which presupposes the growth of differences between people with personal consciousness.

In summary, Homeric man was first of all not a *person*, and in his world there was neither *social action*, nor personal will. He was rather under the control of, on the one hand, the immortal and immoral gods and, on the other, mortal, moral, and invisible observers. He feared two external authorities, and he feared both divine punishment and loss of human love. His mind was *monological*, not *dialogical*, and he was neither a member of any *interaction party*, nor had any interaction partners. He had no idea of his body as a wholeness because he felt himself to be a part of a larger whole that could not exist by itself. His sense of morality proceeded from censure by an *ego-ideal*, and there was neither *super-ego*, nor superstructure in his *personality*. Insofar as all of his behavior was controlled by the feeling of *shame*, he had no feeling of being responsible for his individual actions and had no sense of *guilt*. His individual consciousness was a *social consciousness* in which "I" was not very different from "we." In a most immediate sense, he had no personal or individual interests, but neither was his consciousness "public." It was instead private, as was the whole world to which Homeric man belonged.

9. Visual Shame versus Auditory Guilt

It should be noted in immediate connection with the preceding discussion that a member of Homeric shame-culture feared punishment by the gods, but only when he dishonored them, shamed them, or disobeyed their direct commands. As Finley notes, the Homeric gods were not only surprisingly indifferent in moral matters, they had little to do

with morality in general (Finley 1977, 138). Furthermore, these gods were not interaction partners even for the heroes, and their voices were voices of command, not of reproach. The voice of the hero, on the other hand, was not heard, and he was living in a visual reality where he could only be seen. He therefore feared people's eyes, not their voices.

The distinction between visual and audial reality also acquired a certain importance in the studies of shame. In light of the difference between social and public consciousness discussed above, the distinction between social and public realms may be used as a replacement for the prominent distinction between private and public realms that is, however, unproductive in the present case. That is to say that the social realm is the visual realm where people can be seen but not heard. This is the realm where shame and the eyes of the others are the main sanction of moral behavior. In contrast to this, the public realm operates through an internalized moral authority, and guilt is its main moral sanction.

The social, or visual, realm is the realm where the person is "cared for" by gods or other care-takers, while the public, or *audial*, realm is the realm where the person is involved in dialogue with significant others who orient his actions and sanction his moral breaches. These two realms can be seen as emerging and existing in temporal sequence such that we can distinguish a transition from the one to the other even in the individual development of the child. To use Tomkins's words, we may say that the transition from shame to guilt is marked off by the end of the stage where children or people in general "should be seen and not heard" (Tomkins 1995, 92).

The visual/audial distinction is significant, and we find it widely attended to in most studies of shame. Its first source of inspiration is found in Freud. What actually happens after the stage of "fear of loss of love" is that "the authority is internalized through the establishment of a *super-ego*," and "it is not until now that we should speak of conscience or a sense of guilt." This dramatic change is seen in the fact that the *fear of loss of love* is replaced by *fear of punishment*. The fear of being found out thereby also "comes to an end" since "nothing can be hidden from the *super-ego*, not even thoughts" (Freud 1985B, 317).

Williams also found the idea of relating guilt and shame to seeing and hearing as promising and suggestive (Williams 1993, 89). This same distinction is suggested by the works of Erikson as well, for whom shame is "visual" while guilt is "auditory." When ashamed, the individual is chased by "the eyes of the world," but the voice of the *super-ego* pursues him when he is guilty. Here too, as Erikson put it, "(v)isual shame precedes auditory guilt, which is a sense of badness to be had all by oneself when nobody watches and when everything is quiet - except the voice of the *super-ego*" (Erikson 1963, 253). Erikson also asserts, like Freud, that the *conscience* fully emerges only at the second stage of development with the appearance of the *super-ego* (ibid., 317). The distinction between shame and guilt is then reflected by the absence of

conscience in respect to shame and its existence in respect to guilt in the form of the internal censorship exercised by the *super-ego*.

Interestingly enough, the individual himself becomes a frightening "eye" with the transition from shame-consciousness to guilt-consciousness, or from collective consciousness to personal consciousness. This change marks an exit from the visual realm and an entry into the audial realm. As Heller put it, "shame is no longer experienced as the 'eye of others' for now, *we are the Eye*. The spell of external authority is broken" (Heller 1985, 23).

The shame-experience "materializes" the glance of the observer as the link that stretches through space and has access to any corner of the "world." The glance is capable of establishing contact with the individual from a distance that need not be limited to any conceivable interaction space. This interaction is thus not exactly *face-to-face*, but rather *face-to-the-eyes* of a face who cannot be seen and whose glance penetrates everywhere. Communication through words is therefore not even necessary since the meaning can be "felt" or implied in a "touch." Not only does the "observer" not have to say anything to produce the effect, he may be at any distance whatsoever from the person who feels observed.

In contrast, guilt "materializes" the voice of the "judge," who needs vision no more than the statue of justice does. But the speaker must be close at hand in order to maximize his power to subordinate since his effect on the individual will be diminished if his voice comes from a distance. While an individual from a shame-culture has no "visible body" but only a visible *face*, as was discussed above, an individual from a guilt-culture does not even have a face but only a *voice*. It is not that his face is somehow "missing," but rather that he is covered in "knight's armor" such that nothing can touch him, not even the all-penetrating glance of the observer. But the question nevertheless remains whether he has an "Achilles' heel, a spot that remained paradoxically unprotected as the loving hand of the god held the hero. As Heller maintains, the fact that the individual himself becomes an observer does not terminate the possibility of shame since the latter is preserved in the possibility "to project back our shame" "through identification" such that the shame of others now puts us to shame (Heller 1985, 23). In other words, the individual's status of observer can be taken away from him and he may, under certain conditions, again acquire the feeling that he has become an object of scornful observation.

The modern world is a world where we hear *words*, not *voices*, and see *masks*, not *faces*. This became possible because neither the face, nor the voice were needed any longer in order to transmit meaning. All meaning is now to be found in the word. This type of development is immediately connected with the introduction of writing

and printing, where the word became "visible" precisely because neither the expression of the face, nor the quality of the voice mattered any longer.³⁷

10. Shame-Culture and the Birth of the "Interplay System"

However truthful Homer's presentation of a vanished world might be, he was a poet and a writer of tales from which we can glean hardly any knowledge about precisely what happened in the past. Although historians have discarded Homer as a "war-correspondent" or "eye-witness" and shown that his works lack historical value, in no way should we evaluate the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* solely in respect to their undeniable literary merits (Finley 1977, 168). Indeed, his tales are an indispensable source of sociologically relevant information that can serve to verify the reconstructions of his world that scholars have carried out solely on the basis of our knowledge of the present. For example, the information found in Homer is sufficient to claim that the world he depicted cannot be conceived of as a world of communications even in the most liberal sense of the term. Nor can it be taken as a world of actions and interactions in the sense in which we understand such terms today.

This does not mean, however, that it is not possible for us to define just what that world was. One such possibility emerges when we turn to Erikson's analysis of *play*. If we accept his "way of looking at things," the world of the Homeric hero may readily be seen as a world of *interplay* between gods and mortals, consciousness and the unconscious, and the imaginary and the real.³⁸ What Erikson observed to be true for children also appears to be true for the Homeric heroes, who "cannot be said or judged to be 'acting' in a systematic and irreversible way, even though they may, on occasion, display a sense of responsibility and a comprehension of adult responsibility which astonishes us" (Erikson 1987, 322). The Homeric heroes may thus not have been "robots," but they surely resemble Erikson's "role-playing puppets in imaginary spheres of 'necessity,'" where "the most horrible dread can live right next to the most reassuring playfulness" (ibid., 321).

The distinction between actuality and reality that Erikson proposes is especially relevant when we seek to discover the "origins" since we then must be able to imagine,

³⁷Luhmann notes that although the introduction of writing and printing is of sociological significance for having made possible the expansion of society "beyond the spatial and temporal limits of interaction," very few sociological studies have explored "the historical consequences of writing and printing," especially in respect to the process of oral communication that now takes places "under the conditions of knowledge stored in written texts" (Luhmann 1987, 116).

³⁸The term *interplay*, introduced by Erikson, should be understood as linked to *ritualization* and "the bonding procedure," which "functions so as to *exclude ambiguity*" and *overcome ambivalence* "in situations which have strong instinctual components" (Erikson 1987, 320).

however difficult it might be, a world in which the relationships between man and nature were not mediated by any pre-given or constructed reality. In other words, this should be a world in which there were not only no "subjects," but also, and more importantly, no clearly distinguishable objects. The world as it is first presented to us is neither a reality, nor an "objective reality." To put it in systems terms, this is a world whose complexity has not been reduced. That which can be perceived there are not objects, for this requires mental constructions, but rather the blurred images of existing things, or "shadows" in Plato's terminology.

That is why we must go beyond *constructed reality* and discover the *actuality* that Erikson defined as "the leeway created by new forms of interplay" if we wish to discover the world Homer depicted (Erikson 1987, 336). The latter should then be a world of "group life characterized by total playfulness," where there are no *stereotypes* but only a "playfully structured visual field."³⁹ The importance of this latter observation is that this world in which the child lives, which is also the world of the Homeric hero, comes to replace an apparently unstructured world of constant motion.

From this point of view, the question concerning the "birth" of human action may be approached from a new angle. That we cannot speak about "actions" in Plato's cave is grounded in the fact that every action requires a necessary stabilization and restriction of the visual field, i.e., a concentration upon a particular object, or even a particular point, where the action is to be applied. An action requires an object-aim, the status of which will be changed as a result of the applied action. Strictly speaking, actions in a constantly changing environment are impossible insofar as changes can be introduced only into that which itself does not change.

Action cannot take place without a preliminary *visual discrimination* of the irrelevant, a narrowing of the visual field, a contemplation or concentration upon what is being perceived. Homeric man was apparently incapable of doing precisely that, and it can be argued that such an inborn "visual defect" necessarily corresponded to a particular stage of mental development. The "infantilism" of a man of the Dark Ages thus had less to do with an undeveloped consciousness, as is often imagined, than with an imperfect sense of "vision" that allowed him to see the world in no more than blurred images. The impossibility of *focusing* on an object cannot help but be a

³⁹In his essay on "Play and Actuality," Erikson appeals that we comprehend how Freud's *Wirklichkeit* cannot be translated by only one of its meanings, namely, *reality*. He further suggests that while *actuality* is the world in which human beings begin their life, it is later replaced by *reality* defined as "the structure of facts consensually agreed upon in a given stage of knowledge." The actual world thus becomes inaccessible to mature adults, practically turning into "a lost world" for them. However, "Without actuality, reality becomes a prison of stereotype, while actuality always must retest reality to remain truly playful" (Erikson 1987, 336). "Great adults," whose "sense of identity vastly surpasses the roles foisted upon them," and whose "vision opens up new realities, and their gift of communication revitalizes actuality," are then no other than those "gifted with genius" (ibid., 335).

precondition for the impossibility of understanding the world, or at least of seeing it as anything than chaotic, i.e., hyper-complex.

In this sense, the world of the wandering hero was not yet a world of action. At most it can be presented as a world of "Dark Age knights" jousting with "wind mills." That which can be observed should instead be called *e/motion*.⁴⁰ That even the immortal and imperishable gods in Homer's poems were seen in constantly changing images may be taken as a sure sign of the "visual disease" from which the Homeric heroes suffered, and perhaps all infants as well.⁴¹ Homer, however, opened a space for a playing with danger that structures the world, however imperfectly, reduces or even excludes ambiguity, and facilitates the process of adaptation through the mobilization of instincts. The nature of Homer's educational program can thus be termed "learning by playing," the essence of which was that the best adaptation to a world of unpredictable complexity and insecurity could only be the life of a hero, i.e., a life of constant motion in a world of constant motion.⁴²

Most importantly, however, Erikson found play to be responsible for the process of constructing human *identity*, which is rooted "in the joint sense of being both subject and object" (Erikson 1987, 319). Viewed in this light, the behavior of the hero as an ultimate subject of "action" and an object of divine intervention becomes more comprehensible. The role of shame-culture in attaining the ability to learn, with its obsession to preserve face and vision, is indispensable insofar as "it is the gift of vision which first serves to integrate the unconnected discreet stimulations" of the other senses. Following Spitz, Erikson "ascribes to organized vision the role of a first *ego nucleus*, anchored 'in a special sector of man's central nervous system, which permits a first integration of experience'" (ibid., 316).⁴³ And if vision is "the basic organizer of the sensory universe and if the beholding of one person's face

⁴⁰Plato accused the poets, who described the world as a world of object of ever-changing forms, of being responsible for this state of "blindness" (*Cratylus*, 440 a; *Philebus*, 59 a, b, c).

⁴¹Homer himself, being blind, could not possibly have suffered from any visual disease. This is perhaps why he was more able than others to concentrate on the particular "object" he examined, namely, human speech and the oral tradition. There is no paradox in the fact that a blind man in an Age of Darkness might come to understand his world better than those who see, even becoming their teacher in perception. The fact that Homer alone succeeded in discovering the main principles of the social "game" that he could not see must somehow be connected with his involuntary deprivation of participation. In order to participate in the *Spielraum* of visual games, it is necessary to have a face that both is looked at and "looks."

⁴²It should be no surprise that Socrates claimed the etymology of the word "*sophia*" (wisdom) is connected with "rapid motion" and with the possibility of being in touch with such motion (*Cratylus* 412c).

⁴³Erikson notes that "playful encouragement" on the part of the mother, or "watcher," and the resulting sense of "mutuality," comprise "the prime facilitator of that 'ego nucleus'" (Erikson 1987, 316).

by another is the first basis of a sense of mutuality," then the loss of that face should be experienced as "object loss." We thus arrive at the definition that Freud gave to the sense of shame, namely, "a fear of loss of love."

The fear of the Homeric hero is a double fear in this respect. Insofar as "the coherence and the continuity of the object world are a condition for the coherence and continuity of the 'I' as observer," his fear is the "total fear" of a total loss. On the one hand, this is a fear of losing the "object wholeness," of losing the protecting love of the goddess, whose "face," to paraphrase Erikson, "shines upon the hero's searching eyes" and lets herself "be thus verified as one 'totality'" (Erikson 1987, 316). On the other, he fears the loss of his own face as a "subject wholeness." Unlike the *role*, the *face* cannot be "exited," and it remains dangerously exposed and insecure in a world of other faces equipped with vision. Loss of face is thus a loss of social presence, a loss of "life," a disintegration of the individual body into its compound pieces that only the face can integrate.

The face of a man from a shame-culture has, however, a *value* that can be increased, decreased, or lost. In other words, the face is no different than any *social medium* (such as money or language) to which new value can be added if it is invested in a bold and risky enterprise. But a face cannot increase its value simply through conformity, obedience, and not breaking the rules. The beauty of the face is a treasure, shining with all the colors of precious stones. But if this treasure is not "cultivated" and invested in human enterprise, its inborn, inherent value may quickly be exhausted without leaving a trace. Prior to the struggle for honor and the emergence of the Homeric hero, apparently all that was left to such a face was to burn out in the flames of the shame-experience.

Honor is, therefore, the opposite of *shame*. To struggle for honor is to break with the passivity that the moral code of shame-culture stipulates. But, as it has been noted, the hero is not an actor, although he is not paralyzed by the fear of visible movements, as are his fellow countrymen. He does not *act*, but he is *active*.

The blind poet Homer must thus be credited as the first accurate "observer" of those changes in the social world in which a new *Spielraum* was born, namely, the *realm of honor*. The transformation of the human face into a medium which, as any other medium, can *capitalize* itself is perhaps the first revolutionary move on the way to civilization. The face came forth from the realm of its private anonymity and became associated with a *name* that began to carry all the burdens of fame and shame. It might be that success was ascribed to the gods, but fame was ascribed to the hero's name. And the name became capital that could be inherited, and which lay at the foundation of the Greek system of citizenship more than any other inheritable material property.

Homer was believed to have been the first teacher of the Greeks, who should regulate the whole of their lives by following the poet, even though Plato complained in the

Republic that this reputation was undeserved. In the light of the above analysis, however, whether the philosophers wish to acknowledge it or not, the blind poet Homer emerges as the man who "opened the eyes" of those who could see. Stated otherwise, he was responsible for the first Enlightenment that illuminated the Dark Ages. To him goes all the credit for preparing the breakout from the paralyzing embrace of that realm of shame where men were born into the open structured *Spieletraum* of honor. With his poems, which were in the mouths of all Greeks, Homer taught the people of the whole of Hellas to play and thus cultivate their faces, transforming them from an object of contemplation into *media* that could be shaped into all possible forms by all possible emotions. The human face was thus prepared for the eventual fixation of social roles upon it.

"Learning by playing" as a basic learning process, one product of which is "the social face," even in our own world, always proceeds "learning by doing" and remains an indispensable prerequisite for adapting to the actual world, which is screened by the constructed reality in which the life of the mature individual transpires. In this sense, the way of looking at things that Erikson invites is, surprisingly enough, a way in which the social world can be seen by a naked eye with "blurred vision," i.e., a vision not concentrated on any object but rather on the *relationships* between things. Perhaps this is the way of looking at "things" that acquires a special value in anthropology, where alien and remote worlds can never be understood by a civilized outsider unless he first removes the "glasses" which form his ethnocentric vision. However, the anthropologist most surely must put them back on when he returns to the modern world, where every normally socialized man is granted such "glasses" upon reaching maturity.

11. Respect for Life versus Respect for the Person

According to common opinion, the experience of shame is typical for "more sensitive people" who, in contrast with those with "thick skins," care more about the opinion of others. What the former have and the latter lack is a sense of "respect for others." But this emphasis on "personal sensitivity" directs attention to personal disposition to shame, and not to some common feature of human beings in general. It is commonly accepted, at least in the modern part of the world, that women are more prone to shame since they always have been considered to be more "sensitive" than men, or more concerned about others, in respect to others' opinions as well what happens to them. It also can be said, however, that men and women seem to be sensitive about different things, such as women being traditionally more concerned about their appearance while men are more concerned about physical power. It also seems that men care less about the opinion of others than women.

Not only shame and sensitivity, but, paradoxically enough, *respect for others* are not included in the moral codex of the modern man. Respect for others seems more like a virtue of traditional and simple societies, whose moral codes and community morality sanction all behavior that appears to be selfish. The type of disrespect for others that shame is supposed to sanction involve, for example, taking more than one's own share from a common good which is scarce and leaving less for others; sitting when older people and pregnant women are standing; disregard for the opinions of older people or people with experience, who are always supposed to know best, etc. Shame and respect for others are thus irreconcilable with the morality of the modern world, where a display of this type of respect is understood as a subordination of self to others, putting the interest of others before that of oneself. In other words, such respect for others comes to be associated with understating one's own significance and worth while exalting that of all others. In the modern world, having respect for others or being modest may also be an indication of little or no self-control, or of a need for external control and low self-esteem. *Shame* also appears, therefore, to be the "other" of *pride*, which is incompatible with any disregard of self and *foreign over-control*, such as the respect for other implies (Erikson 1963, 254).

According to Charles Taylor, *insensitivity* is the result of certain accidents in early childhood that deprive the individual of an account of the impact of his own actions on others.⁴⁴ In addition, Taylor makes it clear that we should not talk about personal *responsibility* in such cases, where people are simply unable to see certain things and understand what they actually do to others because they "have been marked by truly harrowing early experiences" (Ch. Taylor 1985, 39).

In this regard, a certain decline in respect for others and a loss of sensitivity can be viewed as results of a deliberately organized process of socialization and the transition from the more traditional realm of *primary socialization* to the modern realm, in which the process of *secondary socialization* takes place. For the individual, this also constitutes the transition from childhood to maturity, which involves leaving the world of feelings and emotionally charged language and entering into the world of specialized languages and emotionless reason. The decline in the modern world of what is here discussed as "respect for others," whereby one considers the other to be superior to him, can thus be seen as one result of the "export" of moral norms and rules that organize the lives of adults and hold true for the process of secondary

⁴⁴"An insensitive person, or a fanatic, cannot see what he is doing to others, the type of suffering he is inflicting on them. He cannot see, for instance, that this act is a deep affront to someone's sense of honor, or perhaps deeply undermines his sense of worth. He is proof to all remonstrating on our part. He cannot listen to us because he has closed off all sensitivity to questions of honor, or perhaps to the sense of personal worth, in himself, say; and this might in turn be related to earlier experiences which he has undergone. These earlier experiences account for a shape of his current experience in which these issues figure as specious and of no account, and this current shape makes it impossible for him to allow the insights we are pressing on him" (Taylor 1985, 38).

socialization into the primary world of the child, where one acquires his basic consciousness as a social being.

Within the context of the present discussion, sensitivity to the opinion of others and respect for the other are phenomena of the *social consciousness* that every individual is supposed to acquire early in life. In the advanced stages of the process of socialization, however, this consciousness becomes an obstacle to the process of individuation and specialization. It is, therefore, effectively suppressed through the formation of *personal consciousness*, but it is never entirely lost. Modern man thus has two types of consciousness, the possession of which makes it possible for him to belong to two different worlds, or to have both private and public lives.

The world in which modern man, with his *personal consciousness*, plays his social role is not completely indifferent towards the other. Respect for the other instead takes a different form here, which in the ethical code of the modern world is designated as "other-regard." This difference is to be found in the fact that, instead of respect for the other as a human being, "one's other-regard takes the form of adherence to constraints on what one may do to others" (Schmidtz 1993, 53). This type of relationship between the individual and the other may also take the somewhat "milder form" of a *concern* for other people's welfare that does not entail "regard" (ibid.).

Rational choice theory, however, has encountered significant problems in justifying the rationality of these *concerns for others*, which should be seen as "departures from pure self-regard" (Schmidtz 1993, 53). Defining altruism as *other-regarding action* reveals the possibility to treat such actions not only as going beyond rationality, but as also going beyond the requirements of justice within the confines of the legal system. As Schmidtz observed, "action motivated by other-regard clearly constitutes an interesting category from a rational choice perspective" (ibid.).

From the perspective of the modern moral code, concerns for others on one's own account is perhaps first and foremost "childish." For example, we may encourage the behavior of our child standing in defense of a friend who gets beaten and gets beaten himself instead, while we may not encourage his disloyalty when, in order to avoid trouble himself, he talks to the teacher and betrays his friends. But this morality is somehow incompatible with the norms of behavior that, for example, a job in a modern organization implies, where such actions are at least irresponsible if not actually criminal. This is something that often produces a real shock in the transition between adolescence to maturity, when children finally discover that the world of their role-playing parents is a world of hypocrisy, and that in order to enter it they are required to hide their humanity or feelings behind a mask. The "heroic age" for them is gone, and what society demands from them is to become ordinary social members who obey the laws of justice and reason. The time of free interplay is also gone, replaced by a game with strictly defined rules, obligations, and duties.

There is no place in the actions of rational actors, which are distinguished by deliberation, personal will, and planing towards rationally chosen ends, for respect for the other, humility, modesty, and an underestimation of one's own abilities in respect to others. The only form in which other-regard can emerge is in that of a "dynamic kind of self-regard," which involves taking into account the effect of our choices in a self-reflective manner such that allowance is made "for the possibility for developing new and other regarding concerns" (Schmidtz 1993, 55). This reflective model of rational choice, seen as "the seed from which our regard for others must grow," is suggested as morally preferable to the instrumental rationalism that prescribes a commitment to serving one's one preferences (ibid., 54).

In any case, the reflective model is a compromise solution and not a return to the stage of the free play of emotions and feelings. It is a perfection of rational behavior whereby other-regard is incorporated into the pattern of behavior of the rational agent as a more sophisticated expression of self-regard. Such other-regard, however, is perceived as possible only when "personal survival is not an urgent concern" and "circumstances leave us with free time." It is only then this more reflective kind of rationality may "weigh in favor of trying to develop broader interests" (Schmidtz 1993, 57). Stated otherwise, other-regard emerges more like a stage in the development of rational actor who, since he is certain of his place in the world, may also begin to be concerned with others. As long as one is struggling to survive, however, only strict adherence to rational rules may help, whereby one is not supposed to be responsive to others at the cost of becoming unresponsive to oneself insofar as this would amount to irresponsible, irrational, or immature behavior.

According to one principle of morality, a rational being can neither help others without first helping himself, nor cannot break the law, especially if this would involve personal injury or even the loss of one's life. Taking care of oneself is a prerequisite for taking care of the other.⁴⁵ Only an "irrational being" is capable of personal sacrifice, placing the interests and well-being of another, and even perhaps of the whole, before concerns for his own safety. The difficulties faced by theories of rationality, however, come from the fact that the realms of feelings and reason cannot be clearly separated. Rational actors are people with feelings, and when these feelings are measured on one and the same scale with rationality, they may well prevail. It apparently depends on what is at stake. Parents are thus capable of great sacrifice, even breaking the law, in order to safeguard their children. The latter can easily involve actions that parents would not perform for themselves or for their own sake, even things that could be seen as irrational and criminal, even though no one would state this clearly

⁴⁵In defining the concept of care as a legitimate moral imperative, Giddens writes: "Care is the opposite of egoism, but shouldn't be equated with altruism. For care of the self - a responsible attitude towards self and body - is at the origin of the ability to care about, and care for, others" (Giddens 1996, 248).

or make an open attempt to condemn them as immoral. Even in our modern world morality has no single code; rather, the modern world has been so organized that all those who enter it must necessarily accept the perspective from which it has no reasonable alternative. But the moral code of a member of the social system is not the moral code of the human being who has not yet become its member.

On the basis of these considerations, we may conclude that the question of a sensitive regard for others, or respect for others, has no moral or rational answer in absolute terms.⁴⁶ What can in fact be observed is a contradiction between two equally legitimate moral codes that belong to two different worlds. If this difference is not articulated, then the issue of the morality of the rational actor remains theoretically unresolved. These two different sets of moral norms and rules do not export well into their opposite worlds, and whenever we find them there, they should play only a subordinate role or be minimized.

Amartya Sen's distinction between *sympathy* and *commitment* provided the basis for Schmidt's definition of other-regard (Schmidt 1993, 59).⁴⁷ While sympathy has more to do with respect for others, commitment, which necessarily implies internalized moral ideals, has more to do with other-regard. In other words, sympathy does not require the *super-ego*, but commitment does. Furthermore, the world in which shame and respect for others is a moral norm is a world in which the highest value is life as such, and not any particular individual. Respect for the other is, therefore, not respect for a person, but rather a *respect for life*. The respect for others, or other-regard, that can be found in the moral code of the modern world has nothing to do with "life."⁴⁸ It is the respect paid to a person by another person, and it is a rational choice to pay respect to the personal choices of others. The particular behavior of man who treats a woman with respect can thus be considered in one world as a sign of politeness, good upbringing, and civilized manners, while the very same behavior can be taken in another world as humiliating and disrespectful towards women as persons.

⁴⁶It was finally recognized that "there is a limit to how much other-regard is rational, but whether that opens a gap between rationality and morality is an open question." Moreover, the question about "(w)ether other-regarding action has better consequences than self-regarding action in a given case is an empirical question" (Schmidt 1993, 67).

⁴⁷Sen's definition appears to be somewhat broader. He defined sympathy as a person's sense that his well-being is psychologically tied to someone else's welfare, "whereas commitment involves counterpreferential choice. If the knowledge of torture of others makes you sick, it is a case of sympathy; if it does not make you feel personally worse off, but if you think it is wrong and you are ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment" (Schmidt 1993, 59).

⁴⁸Arendt wrote in discussing freedom that all concerns about the security of life belong to the private realm. However, when we turn to what she called the "public realm," here described as guilt-culture, "we have arrived in a realm where the concern for life has lost its validity" (Arendt 1978, 156).

Rationality is always coupled with choice, and where there is no choice, there is little room for any reasoning. Taking this into account, the issue does not concern the absence of self-centered rationality, but rather the impossibility of such rationality given a lack of choice. In other words, this is the question of the *singleness of the world* in which the individual lives, which cannot be lost.⁴⁹ When the single world to which the individual belongs is at stake, he arguably should be expected to become a hero who invests all his emotions into the defense of this world and shows an inexplicable disregard of his own personal safety. Concern about one's own life and concern about the world then merge together into one single motive for action.

For independent and free agents, however, who live in a world of *multiple realities*, a danger to the world in which they currently happen to reside does not provoke the same pattern of behavior. Self-centered reason will instead prevail, in respect to which priority upon personal survival is the only rational strategy since personal survival is viewed as a precondition for caring for the other's survival and that of the world. The threat of dismissal from one of a multitude of existing possible worlds in no way compares to the threat of being excluded from one single world. Indeed, the latter threat produces an anxiety akin to the fear that the Earth itself might be destroyed.⁵⁰ The value of a single world located in a specific place is incomparably greater than the value of any of the multiple realities that realize themselves in the space above it. When the world is viewed as a single world, it is not the individual, however unique he might be, that is the supreme value, but the *whole* or the *world*. The *individual* can emerge as the highest value only in a world perceived as multiple realities.

It must be emphasized in this respect that *aidos* apparently belonged to the moral code of a world which itself was the highest value, not the individual, insofar as this world was perceived as a unique, *single world* that had no alternative. What especially deserves attention is the fact that a threat to the existence of a *single world*

⁴⁹This consideration is immediately related to the enigma represented at times by the behavior of children, slaves, or dependent women. For example, children of violent and abusive parents may nevertheless experience very tender and deep feelings towards them that many would feel are not deserved. The same is also true of slaves, who, regardless of their masters' cruel treatment, are often capable of great concern and regard for them, as well as notorious loyalty. Certain historians have observed that slaves may not only not revolt, but actually fight on the side of the master against those who do (Finley 1973, 83). Perhaps the key to understanding slave-psychology is similar to the key to understanding children's psychology insofar as children, slaves, and housewives have one thing in common, namely, they live in worlds where there is no "other."

⁵⁰Only when we consider the singleness of the pre-modern world in which, as Giddens might put it, space was not yet differentiated from place, can we understand the harshness of *ostracism* or religious *excommunication* as measures of punishment throughout the history of the non-modern world. Such sanctions apparently lost their efficiency and meaning with the multiplication of possible worlds and the emergence of possibilities for "re-socialization" or religious conversion.

produces more *heroes* and more irrational, "childish" behavior than any other moment in human history. A danger to the whole to which a given part belongs produces the effect of *self-awareness*, i.e., the emergence of a human being who, as a part, has a consciousness of the whole and asks himself the typical question "Who am I." Not only can we say that the Homeric hero was preoccupied with this question, we must also remember that he was a wandering hero returning home from a war that marked the destruction of one entire world.

An increased awareness of the singleness of the world in which we live brings us closer to the morality of civilizational childhood, but on the level where concern about the other becomes ever more a moral imperative imposed upon individual rationality from without. The notion that the rational agent can start thinking about the other and reflect upon what he does "when time allows" amounts more to wishful thinking than to real changes in the morality of the rational agent. What can instead be seen is that the individual is becoming increasingly confronted with the charge that his actions are irrational in view of the singleness of the world in which he acts.

Two important points should finally be considered. First of all, regard for others as a moral norm of interpersonal behavior was not only an essential part of the moral code of the "childhood" of civilization, but its general significance in the process of the primary socialization of children has been preserved even today. Secondly, the respect for other that shame implies in the sense in which it has been interpreted here as *respect for life* cannot lose its significance and meaning and can never be banished from the world, however modern the latter might have become. Nor can respect of a more "selective" nature, i.e., respect for the *person* (not a human being in general), be criticized for a "lack of humanity" or be abandoned as a moral principle because it belongs to a different world, namely, to the world of freedom and action, where it comes to regulate relationships not between human beings, but between role-playing persons.

It would be premature to conclude that the feeling of shame in any of its meanings, such as dishonor, modesty, or respect for others, belonged to a lost world whose morality has nothing to do with that of our contemporary world. Nor can the feeling of guilt and other-regard be put forward as features of a universal morality that came to elaborate and supersede an already outmoded moral code. Exploring the relationships between these moral codes and the differences between the worlds to which they belong is, therefore, as much an exploration of the future as it is an exploration of the past.

12. Loss of Face versus Loss of Status of a Person

The modern word *person* has so much departed from its original meaning that it has become impossible to use it as a concept. Person can mean many things today, including man, individual, self, personality, and the legal person as a subject of rights and duties. As was noted above, Homeric man was *not* a person, but this does not mean that he was not a human and social being. To say that he was not a person rather means to identify him from the point of view of the modern world, i.e., as that which the modern person is not.

The "lost" world that we want to resurrect is not only that of Homeric man, but every world in which shame plays a role of moral censorship. It would be much better to designate this world as an *aidos-culture* rather than as shame-culture insofar as our modern term shame does not express the full range of its "ancestor's" important meanings. But since shame-culture has already become a scientific term, it is perhaps too late to plead that it should be replaced. In any case, shame (*aidos*)-culture and guilt-culture will be discussed here as ideal types that can be found in different parts of the contemporary world (including its most modern part), even today.

Since shame-culture and guilt-culture have different types of morality, the criteria for social presence and absence in these two worlds is different, and those who are persons in the one world may not be regarded as persons in the other. A further question that should be raised, however, is whether or not a man in shame-culture was not a different type of "person," with another type of self and personality that the modern world cannot help but describe in negative terms. This different type of "person" can most appropriately be called a "face." That which the members of a shame-culture acquire as a result of the process of socialization is a *face*, which is what they cherish most and fear to lose. In other words, the status of a "face" can be lost as a result of moral censorship in a culture that punishes all those who break the *unwritten* moral rules and norms. Shame-cultures have their own "legal practices" for controlling their members and sanctioning liberties in behavior by means of social exclusion. Those who have "lost" their faces in a shame-culture are not present since one who has no face to show and no right to claim any respect for himself is a "non-person" in the context of *aidos-culture*.

At the same time, it must be noted that the analysis of guilt-culture has until now been confined to its micro-sociological aspects and, consequently, it has never actually been made clear why modern man should fear punishment and what he loses if he is guilty. The first thing that comes to mind in a macro-sociological perspective is neither conscience, nor psychological balance, but *freedom*. What the individual member of a guilt-culture fears is, first of all, a loss of rights that are attached to his status as a *person*. The right to be considered as a person is a prerequisite for the right to freedom. But it goes both ways: only those who are persons are free,

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and only those who are free can be treated as persons. To be a person is thus not a property of the individual and it does not refer to some peculiarity of an individual's psychology. It is rather a property that the individual acquires in the public space.

Regardless of the liberal tendency to use "person" as a reference to any human being, we still do not use this word to refer, for example, to children. Children may have rights as human beings, but even in the modern world they do not have rights as persons. Regardless of the democratic spirit of our times, children will not be given the right to vote or rule a state any time soon. In addition, the less urbanized a particular place is, the less the word "person" appears to be in use. It is also clear that the term "person" does not belong to the private realm of the home, where even the outsiders who visit are referred to as men, women, relatives, neighbors, or simply "faces," not as persons.

The use of the word "person" underlines the existence of a kind of interaction distance that is not presupposed by *face-to-face* interaction. "Person" seems to be a word from the lexicon of the public realm, and all qualities of the individual are ascribed to his status as person, including moral conscience, legal status, and, most importantly, interaction status. In a very strict sense, interactions in the public realm are neither *face-to-face*, nor *man-to-man*, but rather *person-to-person*.

The individual thus does not acquire the right to become a *person* as the result of some type of natural process, such as attaining a particular age, even though this might seem to be the case. On the contrary, a human being becomes a *person* through a particular type of socialization process, through a particular type of education, and through acquiring role-specific languages. To be a person is not only a quality of self, or a particular moral quality, but also implies playing a social *role*. To be a person is to be a free agent with rights and duties.⁵¹

In guilt-culture, those who transgress the law or are found guilty of criminal actions lose their freedom as agents, not their faces. They do not fear "loss of love," but as soon as they are found guilty, they are deprived of their status as persons and interaction partners. Criminals, and even the accused in court, are thus neither "addressees" nor "respondents" since in a sense they are not considered to be present. They instead need to be re-presented by people who enjoy such rights, i.e., by other persons. In other words, the status of person in a guilt-culture, just like the status of a familiar face in a shame-culture, is not unconditionally granted but can be lost.

Although shame and guilt seem to serve similar functions, they cannot replace each other because they regulate social life in two different social realms. People fear loss of *love* in the one and *punishment* in the other; people fear loss of *face* in the one and loss of the right to be a *person* in the other.

⁵¹ A most intimate relation exists between, on the one hand, role-theory's assertion that virtually every human being is a role-player and, on the other, the use of the term "person" instead of "human being." Every human being who plays a role is also a person.

It is thus difficult to assert that guilt is a much better feeling than shame. Both shame and guilt are severe moral sanctions and punish the individual very harshly. Neither is milder than the other. The transition from the world of shame to the world of guilt is not a "move" in the direction of absolute freedom, as it might have seemed. Nevertheless, guilt is better than shame since when one is punished in the world of guilt and his *freedom* suspended, he still may preserve a degree of social life and even have the *liberty* to do things that free people feel constrained to do. But when the *liberty* of a member of shame-culture is taken away and he has no face to show, it is as if his whole life has been taken away and no social realm is left where he may shelter and continue his social existence. Shame is always the main motive for and ultimate cause of suicide, even in those cases when guilt seems to have been the cause.

13. Slavery versus Freedom

If we assume that *freedom* is not only a fundamental principle of democracy, a high human ideal, and an essential prerequisite for happiness, but first and foremost a necessary condition for the emergence of the *person*, then the prototype of the *person* within the context of European civilization should arguably be sought in the ancient Greek *polis*. In other words, the search for a prototype of the person leads our analysis back to the time when the personal properties (virtues) of the citizen first became a topic of moral, political, and legal discourse. Following Arendt, we consider that the difference between public and private realms not only coincided with the difference between the realm of shame and that of guilt, but also with the difference between the realm of slavery and that of freedom.

The status of citizen in classical antiquity did not necessarily imply that one was a slave-master or a man of wealth and property. Nor did being a slave necessarily mean that one was poor. Such interpretations should instead be attributed to the modern "bias" of our economically driven world.

To be a *citizen* in the Greek *polis* meant to have the right to be present in the public realm, "to share in the offices and honors of the states" (Aristotle 1986, 1278a, §9). The first condition for acquiring this right was to be the son of a citizen-father. Foreigners, as well as those who were not "sons" but the daughters or wives of citizens, did not have the right to be citizens, regardless of their degree of wealth and even though they might have been free. This means that freedom was a *necessary* but not a *sufficient* condition for citizenship and for acquiring the status of person. It is interesting to note that it was forbidden in the ancient Greek *polis* to mention the names of women in public places, which means, in other words, that women did

not have the right to be considered as addressees or respondents, and that their presence was virtually not to be acknowledged.⁵²

Slaves in the city-state were also neither citizens, nor persons, but not only because their fathers did not have the right names, or because their names could be changed at their masters' will, although this doubtlessly indicated the absence of interaction roles. Most importantly, they were not free and thereby lacked certain essential rights that could be received only on the occasion of their manumission. Fortunately, the rights that slaves acquired on the occasion of their liberation can be found in the Delphic inscription recording slave manumissions: "1. He is to be his own representative, his own master, in all legal matters, without need of intervention of a second party. This is the legal expression of freedom. 2. He is not subject to seizure as property. Said otherwise: No one dares lay hand upon him. 3. He may do what he desires to do. 4. He may go where he desires to go. Or, in a variant form, he may live where he desires to live" (Westermann 1964, 10).

Not only slavery, but apparently any type of servitude, or the placement into service of a free man whereby he virtually becomes a means to someone else's ends, can create difficulties for preserving the status of person.⁵³ A person in this context is one who acts to attain ends that were chosen on the basis of moral principles, to attain personally defined ends, or to fulfill public duties, but he does not act to attain someone else's ends. To take away a person's freedom is to take away his social presence, and this always means death, be it physical or social. Presence in the public realm, which is the only means to ascribe the identity of a person to an individual, is not about having or not having life, but about having a "good life."⁵⁴ Nor is it about satisfying

⁵²Aristotle quotes Sophocles in order to justify his position that goodness for a woman is different from goodness for a man: "A modest silence is a woman's crown" (Aristotle 1968, 1260a, §11). Not only were women not supposed to have a voice, their names should not even be heard. Pericles' address to the women in his Funeral Oration at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War makes it even more clear that women were supposed to be "invisible" in the public realm: "Your great glory is not to be inferior to what God has made you, and the greatest glory of a woman is to be least talked about by men, whether they are praising you or criticizing you" (Thucydides 1975, II, 46).

⁵³In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Socrates thus persuades a person working for hire to attach himself to "someone of those that have larger fortunes (who require a person to assist him), and, superintending his work, helping to gather in his fruits, and preserve his property, to benefit him, and to benefit by him in return." The answer is, however, "I should with great reluctance, Socrates, ... submit to slavery." Yet those who have the superintendence in states, and who take care of the public interests, are not the more like slaves on that account, but are thought to have more of the free-man." In this sense, making yourself "responsible to someone" is not the same as making yourself responsible to the state (*Memorabilia*, VIII).

⁵⁴Arendt writes in this connection that, "Without mastering the necessities of life in the household, neither life nor the 'good life' is possible, but politics is never for the sake of life" (Arendt 1958, 37).

or not satisfying needs, for it is not about needs at all. It is only concerned with *desires*, for which alternative possibilities to satisfy them exist.

For Aristotle, *sensation*, *reason*, and *desire* were the three things "in the soul" that are in control of action and truth, whereby the origin of action, or its "efficient cause," is *choice*, while "that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end." Action cannot, therefore, originate from sensation, and it always presupposes a practical intellect that moves towards an appropriate end defined by a moral state. Action is bound to the ability to make right choices and deliberate about the future, which always presupposes alternatives and requires intellect and reason (Aristotle 1986, 1139a). Aristotle attributed such abilities to the good citizen, who has the experience of ruling and being ruled, and he denied them to any "slave by nature," who has neither choice, nor the ability to make right choices.

In Aristotle's conception, slaves were people who do not belong to themselves, and the only "right" that such people have, is to belong to someone else, even though they are men, thus becoming an article of property. This type of "thing" is an instrument that aids the actions of and is separable from its owner. To the extent that the man who is used as a means to *someone else's end* is not a person, no actions can be attributed to him. What can be attributed to him is the ability to understand orders. And that which holds true for slaves is also true for children and women.

The interesting point is that Aristotle is convinced that freedom, i.e., the necessary condition for constituting the *legal person*, is not for everyone, and this claim is grounded in certain supposed enigmatic differences in people's "natures." Those with the rational faculty are rulers, and those who can only labor and understand orders, but not take decisions for themselves, comprise slaves and all those who are to be ruled (Aristotle 1968, 11). Children, women, and slaves (domestic servants) supposedly belong to one and the same "class" since they are not their own masters, neither of their thoughts, nor of their hearts, nor of their bodies. In this sense, freedom should be understood not as freedom of action, but rather as the freedom to be one's own master, a master of one's own body, mind, and soul.

However, not all those who were citizens could attain the status of the "citizen par excellence," who should be not only free, but, more importantly, "free from menial duties" (Aristotle 1986, 1278a, §3). In other words, the ideal person, or the citizen par excellence, was not to be engaged in any sort of *labor*. Aristotle thus argues that the "best form of state" does not grant citizenship to the people of manual labor, including those who perform menial duties for individuals (slaves) and "mechanics and laborers, who do them for the community" (ibid., 1278a, §3). These latter people should instead be considered as "necessary conditions of the state." Labor was considered to be slavish in all of its various forms, and the Greek world knew more than one type of "slaves of labor."

An important difference should be made in this respect between *helots*, who "were not foreigners but a subject people working their own lands in a state of servitude," and the majority of slaves in Athens, who were rather of a different sort, i.e., *chattel slaves* (Finley 1964, 66).⁵⁵ Both groups, of course, had one thing in common, namely, they were slaves of *labor*, but *helots* were not "property" in the way chattel slaves were. *Helots* lived in different places from their masters, which meant that only their *labor* was the possession of the master, not their *bodies*. Another important point is that *helots* were native Greeks, while *chattel slaves* were apparently non-Greeks.⁵⁶ Aristotle claimed that Greeks considered that barbarians were "everywhere and inherently slaves," i.e., slaves by nature, while the Greeks were "everywhere and inherently free" (Aristotle 1986, 1255a, §7).

What is even more surprising is that slaves were apparently constantly imported, there being little, if any, practice of breeding slaves in the household. As Finley notes, this creates a real puzzle, or rather is an essential part of the larger puzzle that ancient slavery in principle represents. Finley rejected the "convenient thought" that economic reasons explain the lack of breeding, especially when the fact is taken into account that women were domestic slaves and did not work in the mines. He clearly stated that although it is reasonable to make such an assumption, "the economics which is supposed to justify it" are unconvincing. For Finley, even the "myth" that "there is a demographic law that no slave population ever reproduced itself, that they must always be replenished from outside" is equally no explanation.

Reading the relevant literature in classical scholarship creates the impression that the revolutionary character of Finley's work has not been appreciated. It is not that he merely provided his own explanations instead of using the existing ones, but that he had the courage to assert that confessing you do not know the answer is much better than giving wrong answers. We are obliged to him for removing the "fallacy" concerning slave breeding, and for "leaving the question unanswered" so that the

⁵⁵The status of *helots* seems to have been quite similar to that of dependent peasants in other historical periods. This is evidenced by the fact that "in the interest of national safety" and in times of "military crisis, slaves were freed, conscripted into the army or navy, and called upon to fight," while the institution of slavery survived (Finley 1964, 65-66).

⁵⁶One of the difficulties that Arendt's analysis of ancient slavery encountered was connected with the fact that she took it for granted that slaves in the ancient *polis* were Greeks: "And while under the Roman Republic slaves were, on the whole, drawn from outside the limits of Roman rule, Greek slaves usually were of the same nationality as their masters" (Arendt 1958, 36). This does not seem to have been the case. Greece was no "exception to the rule" that held for all slave systems in the course of European history, one reason being Solon's reform around 594/93 BC known as the "disburdening," especially in Athens after the time of Draco. Athenians and their families could then no longer be enslaved for debts, and all those Athenians who had been sold as slaves had to be traced, bought back, and reinstated. See, for example, Hammond 1967, 159.

field is opened for other sciences to participate in the discussion (Finley 1964, 60).⁵⁷ Indeed, the reasons for the absence of domestic slave breeding are found in neither economy, demography, history, nor archeology. There is nothing else left but to suggest that they must have been *social reasons* which can be explained through sufficiently abstract macro-sociological analysis.

In the language of macro-sociology, the fact that there was no slave-breeding suggests that slaves from abroad were somehow more valuable than those slaves who were domestically bred. That is to say that Greek society could not reproduce the value for which the slave was primarily appreciated. What can this value have been?

In his extremely interesting article about ancient slavery, Finley further notes that the beginning of democracy in the Greek world must have been connected with a certain "innovation," for which, we are told, the "innovators" eventually received a "divine punishment." We know that slavery existed long before the Greeks "invented" it, and that the Thessalians and Lacedaemonians among Greeks used *helots* long before the Chians. The latter, however, appear to have introduced an innovation insofar as they began to acquire slaves by offering "a price" for them. But the astonishing thing is that the Chians were the first to establish democratic institutions, as is evidenced by an inscription from approximately 575-50 BC describing the existence of laws and a council of the people (*demos*). Finley concluded on the basis of this and other examples that "the more advanced the Greek city-state, the more it will be found to have had true slavery rather than 'hybrid' types like *helotage*. More bluntly put, the cities in which individual freedom reached its highest expression - most obviously Athens - were cities in which chattel slavery flourished" (Finley 1964, 72). Classical scholars have thus demonstrated a fact with enormous sociological significance, namely, that *freedom* and *slavery* in the ancient world advanced "hand in hand" (*ibid.*).

Most importantly, this means that the unfree and right-less *non-person* was a necessary condition for the emergence of *freedom* and, hence, the *person*. That is to say that the emergence of the world of the person became possible only as a consequence of the emergence of the world of the non-person, or, in the terms of the present work, the world of shame preceded the world of guilt. The interesting point is that the emergence of the latter presupposes the existence of the former, while the opposite is not the case.

There apparently have been "slave-societies" in which no people were free. Indeed, as Finley points out, the pre-Greek world of the "Sumerians, Babylonians, Egyptians,

⁵⁷Finley appears to have been of the opinion throughout the body of his work that classical scholarship and archeology are not sciences capable of resolving any puzzles. They are rather the sciences responsible for discovering and articulating the pieces of which these puzzles consist, even though they have not been able to ascribe a form to them.

Assyrians, and even Mycenaeans was, in a very profound sense, a world without free men, in the sense in which the west has come to understand this concept." But while there had been slavery in the pre-Greek world, it "was a world in which chattel slavery played no role of any consequence" (Finley 1964, 72).

It is not known precisely from where slavery entered the Greek world, but it seems it could have come from almost anywhere. A much more important question, however, is where the "ideal slave" in the Greek world came from, i.e., a member of shame-culture. Classical scholars have longed tried to discover who the people were who brought change to the Greek world, which, as Thucydides claims in the beginning of his history, was not a shame-culture, being inhabited by people whose main occupation was sailing and piracy. The present work, however, is not concerned with the coming of the Dorians but rather with the coming of *foreign slaves* to the household and the consequent changes to the Greek world, especially Athens.

14. Slaves and Masters: Understanding the Fathers

Classical scholars almost unequivocally find Aristotle's efforts to justify slavery as thoroughly unconvincing and barely credible. He obviously fails to explain why slaves would accept their condition and labor in order to compensate for their masters' lack of labor. While there is no adequate explanation for why there were no significant slave revolts in the Greek world, it is no less than astonishing that we can discern no moral qualms or guilt feelings in respect to slavery on the part of Greek thinkers, be they philosophers or other "believers in the brotherhood of man" (Finley 1964, 62).

The general impression is that reading the philosophical fathers provides us with no more than a very confused idea of what is a slave and what is a master. For example, children were in a most immediate way considered as *wifree* in Plato's time, regardless of whether or not they were the children of free citizens. To the point is Socrates' explanation in *Lysis* of why the boy's position is even worse than that of a slave. Not only does he not have the degree of freedom that even a slave has, he is governed by a slave even though born to a free man (*Lysis*, 208c).¹

¹The interesting point here is that when Socrates asked Lysis who ruled him, the boy pointed to the slave who was accompanying him. Joseph Vogt's article on the role of the domestic slave as *nursemaid* and *pedagogue* is especially revealing in respect to the labor that nurtured the Greek civilization, or provided the "miracle" (Vogt 1960, 19-32). Classical scholars, however, are quite reluctant to lend an ear to such claims, and they continue translating "pedagogue" in its literal sense as a slave who led the child to school. They thus conceal the origin of the modern meaning of *pedagogue*. They also prefer to think that the myth which Herodotus relates about the Thracian king Zalmoxes, who was a slave of Pythagoras and taught him the theory of the immortality of the soul, has nothing to do with reality. Insofar as a slave was always supposed to be an inferior being, it should have been Pythagoras who

At the same time, Plato points out that "slavery" is the only way in which children may become like their fathers and acquire a "superior soul," a position that cannot help but make us think that slavery in antiquity might not have had the same meaning that it has today. Plato wrote in the *Republic* that in order for a man "to have a like government with the best men," "he ought to be the slave of that best man who has within himself the divine governing principle." The slave should thus be governed not "for his own harm," but because he has to become like the man who has good "governance and guidance." Furthermore, this is also the "aim of our control of children, of our not leaving them free before we have established, so to speak, a constitutional government within them." It is even more revealing that Plato claimed that it is necessary to "set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler in the child, and then, and then only," can he be left free (*Republic*, IX, 590c, d, e; 591). But we cannot comprehend where "the best man" comes from? To whom was he "a slave"?

We must apparently consider the possibility that the future "best man" (the boy) is first the "slave" of a "master," namely, his care-taker. But Aristotle's doctrine of the soul stipulates that the souls of such possible care-takers as slaves and women are as inferior as those of the child, albeit in a different way. The only possibility is then to assume that while the "master" who educates the child is, paradoxically enough, a human being with an "inferior soul," he/she is somehow capable of raising children in such a way that they acquire superior souls. This would mean that the better quality of the slave-master depends on social, not genetic, factors, and that his exceptional quality is acquired in a process of primary socialization. But in what kind of world were these slave-masters socialized as children? In what sense was the world of the slave, or the woman, different from that of the man with a superior soul?

In discussing the difference between the *polis* and the household, Aristotle maintained that the state is a political association which not only is "composed of a number of men," but also of "different kinds of men, for similars cannot bring it into existence" (Aristotle 1968, 1261a, §3). The paradigm of the *polis* is apparently that of functional differentiation, whereby "the *polis* is comprised of different elements, mutually exchanging different services in virtue of different capacities" (*ibid.*, §4). The *polis* is a whole that works for the good of each and everyone of its members, whose relationships are those of mutual exchange. The household, on the other hand, is a more of a unit, a "whole" where every part serves the whole and "the goodness of every part must be considered with a reference to the goodness of the whole."

It is paradoxical that the household apparently obeys no economic principles, for its members exchange nothing with each other but rather work together to serve

taught the barbarian. In principle, classical scholars prefer to consider the social world as beginning with individuals, unique thinkers, mortal semi-gods, and great theories, and not with unique *cultures*, as anthropologists would rather claim.

a "common interest," that interestingly coincides with the interest of one single individual, the master. Aristotle does not tell us, however, in what sense the interest of the master and the slave coincide? What was the "interest" of a slave who was unfree, bound to the household, and master of neither his mind, his soul, nor his body? In exchange for what did he unconditionally accept his servitude and work for the whole?

The only answer that Aristotle provides is that the slave is a slave by nature, and that the best thing for such a "natural slave" is to be ruled by someone who is a master by nature. The master's rule is justified by his superiority in goodness, and the purpose of his ruling slaves, women, and children is to improve their "imperfect souls." Arguing against those who think that a slave should only obey commands, Aristotle claims that the master should be "a moral guardian" for slaves and provide them "rational instruction and admonition" even more so than he does to children (Aristotle 1968, 1260b, §14).

Aristotle's discussion of slavery is astonishingly inconsistent.⁵⁹ In what sense should there be "a relation of friendship between master and slave" (Aristotle 1968, 1255b, §10), or in what sense can the slave be a "partner in his master's life" if he supposedly lacks, as Aristotle asserts, any moral qualities? As Barker notes, Aristotle enters into a great contradiction when he claims that "one cannot be a friend with a slave as a slave, but with a slave as a man one can" insofar as this is "a relation of justice as between any person whatever and any other person, whoever he be, who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement." The point supposedly is that if a slave shares in a system of law, "he becomes a subject of rights, and ceases to be a mere object or inanimate instrument" (Barker's comment in Aristotle 1986, 17).

If we wish to understand what Aristotle means here, we must enquire into his language. What does he mean by "friendship" in this case, which apparently cannot be the same as that between free men? Some assistance in this respect can perhaps be found in Plato's *Lysis*, where the main topic of discussion is the meaning of friendship in immediate connection with the relationship between lover and beloved. It is most revealing that Plato connects friendship and love with the possibility of "being used," and he also poses the interesting question whether a lover and beloved can be friends if only the one loves the other while the other hates him. These topics are obviously very relevant questions concerning the relationship between master

⁵⁹On the one hand, Aristotle claims that the master rules the slave on the basis of the justice that exists in the relationship, which is "in every case proportioned to merit" (Aristotle 1986, 1161a). But in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he claims that the relation of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy in Greece, while the rule of the father is tyrannical in Persia since the Persians "use their sons as slaves," he observes that: "Tyrannical too is the rule of a master over slaves; for it is the advantage of the master that is brought about in it" (Aristotle 1986, 1160b).

and slave, especially in the light of the fact that Aristotle defined the main "science" of the master as being the art of *using* slaves.

The metaphors that Aristotle uses are also quite revealing. It appears that the slave and the master supposedly relate to each other as "the part and the whole" and, "like the body and the soul, have an identical interest; and the slave is a part of the master, in the sense of being a living but separate part of his body" (Aristotle 1986, 1255b, §10). In other words, what makes the ideal slave is his consciousness of being a part of a whole, but instead of being a part of a collective whole, he is a part of the master.

From this point of view, the enigma of the progress of Greek society resided less in its use of the slave labor of mechanics and laborers and more in the fact that ancient Greek culture "consumed" shame-culture, as it were, using it as the foundation it needed to construct the public sphere of free people who feared neither shame, nor loss of love. The member of the ideal type of shame-culture was separated from the whole to which he belonged and "appropriated," or "privatized," by the Greek master. The "soul" of such a slave, consisting of his inconceivably social consciousness which, when enclosed in the household, served private interests as if they were social, was the most interesting thing about him, not his physical power. The co-existence of masters and slaves was thus a "community of interest" precisely as Aristotle defined it, whereby both "merit the position in which they stand" by virtue of their different social nature (Aristotle 1986, 1255b, §9).

When we read Aristotle with such ideas in mind, we may be left with the impression that the relationship between a slave and a master was, or at least was supposed to be, one of *love*. This explains why we are met with such silence when it comes to a discussion of the moral legitimacy of slavery. If it was the love of the slave towards his master that legitimized the master's rule, then why was there at least no moral rule that obliged the master to love or respect his slave as well? The lack of reciprocity or any obligation on the part of the master is the sure sign that the master and slave did not belong to one and the same world. They indeed had different "natures." The slave was socially conditioned to love his master, while the master was not.

That is to say that the key to the civilization puzzle resides in the special type of culture that produced the ideal slave. In other words, the slave belonged not merely to a different world than the master, but to a different "universe." It is for this reason that it is so very difficult to see the world of shame-culture in our modern world. Primary socialization in a shame-culture results in the construction of an individual's social conscience such that he has only a single world and fears only one thing in that world, namely, loss of love. Such an individual will do whatever is necessary in order "not to lose the love of the other." And not only is it not even necessary that the other love him/her in return, he may not even know what love is.

In this case, the strange phenomenon that we observe around the fifth century BC in Greece was the result of an encounter between two different "universes," as

Berger and Luckmann might put it, or rather the enveloping of the one by the other. Slaves were always brought to the guilt-driven world of civilization from the outside because they first had to be socialized in a *shame-culture*. Slaves first had to be made into people with a social consciousness, i.e., with a consciousness of depending on the whole. All that then remained to be done was to "transplant this soul" into a different body, to move the part of a larger social whole into a smaller "private whole" such as a household, where slaves would feel they belonged. In other words, slaves in a way resembled exotic fruits that had to be grown in a specific climate.

The ideal slave is thus a human being who loves his master. Only if we accept this hypothesis can we understand why Aristotle held that slavery was neither wrong, morally unacceptable. On the contrary, that which he held to be wrong were deviations from the master-slave model when "matters are otherwise," i.e., when the ideal union and friendship between slaves and masters does not exist "and slavery rests merely on legal sanction and superior power" (Aristotle 1986, 1255b, §9). When Aristotle tells us that the master can also be a friend to his slave as a human being, but not as a slave, he apparently meant not "friendship" as that which exists between free human beings but rather a *love relationship*. But this comprised no obligation for the master, as it apparently did for the slave.

If we accept the hypothesis put forward here, namely, that the prototype for relations between masters and slaves at the beginning of European civilization was a *love-relationship*, and that slaves were sold first and foremost as "love-objects" or, rather, as objects who can love and are capable of satisfying the need of the masters to be loved, then various other enigmas that have appeared in studies of ancient slavery may also be resolved. For example, this notion removes certain obstacles to seeing why and how slaves often voluntarily continued a love-relationship with their masters after being freed. This was apparently a topic of heated discussions, and Aristotle, for one, found it to be most "natural."⁶⁰

More importantly, however, this issue concerns the fact which Finley notes that ancient slavery has become a political issue since the end of the nineteenth century, "a battleground between Marxists and non-Marxists," rather than an historical phenomenon (Finley 1964, 68). If ancient slavery in its special form of *chattel slavery* was a strange manifestation of a love relationship, then "the history of all previously existing societies" is not "the history of class struggle" but rather a history of *gender struggle*, marked by the fact that the love and friendship on which this relationship

⁶⁰The quotation from a fragment that Finley offers is very revealing in this respect: "To suppose, with Timaeus, that it was unlikely that men, who had been the slaves of the allies of the Lacedaemonians, would continue the kindly feelings and adopt the friendships of their late masters is foolish. For when they have had the good fortune to recover their freedom, and a certain time has elapsed, men, who have been slaves, not only endeavor to adopt the friendships of their masters, but also their ties of hospitality and blood" (Finley 1964, 71).

was supposed to have initially rested has disappeared. The class/gender struggle attests that the rule of the "master" has lost its legitimacy. To use Aristotle's words, that type of "slavery" which rests on mere legal sanction and superior *power* has no justification. Instead of banishing labor from the world in order to free the slave, Love should be restored to the status as the sole legitimate grounds for the rule of any "master."

One main conception of the present work contends that language is always created from a particular observation position, and that speaking a particular language means sharing this position. Stated otherwise, language itself comprises an *observation position*. The second question which must then be asked concerning Aristotle's language is what did he mean by "nature"?

Greek thinkers were far from making a distinction that is still difficult to articulate clearly even in our modern times, namely, the distinction between *culture* and *society*. Culture did not exist as a separate entity for the Greeks, and that which had no state organization or empire belonged to "nature." Given such views, it is not strange that Thrace as a whole, as well as its most visible social structure, the Odrysian kingdom, did not exist for the Greeks. More precisely, the way in which Thrace existed for the Greeks was as a "part-object," "an extension of self," or "an appendage of themselves." What follows, then, from Finley's discovery that the slaves in Athens were foreigners, and that most of them were Thracians?⁶¹ That Thrace and Greece existed in a *symbiotic relationship* is evidenced by the fact that Thrace was the source of the "magic" in the Greek world, such as the Thracian gold, the Thracian slave-labor, the Thracian *pedagogues*, the Thracian princesses married to renowned Athenian citizens, the Thracian children sold to childless Athenian citizens, the Thracian mysteries, etc.). As is the case according to the classical model of such symbiotic relationships, the Greeks lacked any attitude of dependency; Thrace rather remained as a country under Greek control that satisfied Greek "needs" as soon as they arose. This childhood of European civilization thus already demonstrates certain important features quite typical of the eventual drive towards an expanded autonomy and negativism in respect to the people who "nurtured" it.⁶²

⁶¹Finley wrote that in certain cases, such as in Laurium in Xenophon's time, the number of Thracian slaves "was greater than the total population of some of the smaller Greek city-states" (Finley 1964, 61). And in general, "(t)he impression one gets is clearly that the majority of the slaves were foreigners. In a sense they were all foreigners. That is to say, it was the rule (apart from debt bondage) that Athenians were never kept as slaves in Athens, or Corinthians in Corinth." Finley concludes that "the majority were not Greeks at all, but men and women from the races living outside the Greek world." This is also evident from the fact that "some Greeks came to identify slaves and barbarians (a synonym for all non-Greeks)" (ibid.).

⁶²Aristophanes tells us that the Thracians were so much "in love" with Athens that the Thracian king Sitalkes scribbled "My beautiful Athenians!" on almost every wall (*The Acharnians*, 141-45). There are

The fact that the Greek states were incapable of "seeing" the Thracians, who were both inside and outside their borders, gave rise to the myth that European civilization emerged from one single people, who were obliged to no one other than themselves for its remarkable progress.⁶³ At no point in the history of European civilization has it been regarded as strange and "unnatural" that Europe had only a "Father" and no "Mother." If Greece was the Fatherland of European civilization, where was the Motherland? Where was "the paradise" that the children of Love and shame had to leave behind?

Moreover, if we attribute a role to culture in the early formation of the individual self, then what Aristotle meant by a "slave by nature" is clarified, namely, a man socialized in a shame-culture, which also happens to be a culture of universal love. But love is quite often rendered "slavish" insofar as one cannot be both in love and free. Love is, paradoxically enough, the other of freedom and, viewed from another perspective, freedom is a lesser "good" than love. It suffices in this regard to remember the empirical fact that in the ancient world, as even today, the threat of being "freed" from all bonds with other human beings is not a "blessing," but may even be worse than being dead.

The fear of loss of love is just another name for the fear of loss of life, and this refers to not only one's own life but to life in general, or anyone's life. Thus, shame and guilt as moral sanctions have much in common. But how is it possible that altruistic shame as well as egoistic guilt are both concerned with life when guilt is not an altruistic feeling but selfish through and through? It is very difficult to understand how guilt can be a pain that one feels in his heart for injuring another.

Studies of guilt have maintained that guilt is the fear of injuring another, of being yourself a threat to life. But since guilt has never before been discussed in its interrelatedness with shame, previous studies have missed the main point. Guilt is not a feeling that we experience for injuring "any life," and it is not a feeling that is always automatically triggered when we do something wrong to another. The *ideal-situation* is rather the situation in which we comprehend that we have injured *someone who loves us*, who trusts us without any reason. Guilt by itself is not a moral sanction since it was apparently established as a moral norm *vis-a-vis* shame-culture, *vis-a-vis* the other who loves us and wants nothing in return. The world of love is quite the opposite of the world of strict economic accounting, and it is also quite

no indications that this love was "mutual" in any respect. It is also revealing that Thucydides the son of Oloros, whom scholars since antiquity have considered to be most humane of all ancient Greek writers, was not Greek, even though he was an Athenian citizen. At best he was a Thracian/Greek.

⁶³The work of Thucydides, the most virtuous text written in classical antiquity and perhaps the sole basis for what could be said to be humanitarian science and sociology alike, remained misunderstood and without followers for millennia.

the opposite of the world of reason. To be able to love means more to be able to give and less to receive, which is precisely how Thucydides characterized Thracian customs.

The German word for guilt (*Shuld*) preserves the meaning of an unpaid debt or obligation that has disturbed the consciousness of the reasonable man who lives in a world of exact measures, where everything is calculated, has a price, needs to be paid back, and is an object of exchange. Therefore, if guilt has become less and less capable in the modern world of playing its moral role, and if the world has become more and more violent and irresponsible towards life, it is precisely because love has been withering away. Those who do not feel themselves loved have no reason to feel guilty.

15. Kant's "Third Doctrine"

If we compare Aristotle's doctrine with yet another doctrine written two millennia later, we may be surprised to see how little the world has changed, at least when it comes to its fundamental beliefs and morals.

In "The Doctrine of Right," Kant defines a *person* as "a subject whose actions can be *imputed* to him," and he distinguishes him on this basis from the *thing*, "to which nothing can be imputed" and which is an "object of free choice which itself lacks freedom" (Kant 1991, 223). By not depriving himself of the "prerogative of a moral being," and by preserving his dignity and inner freedom, man fulfills his duty to himself insofar as he would otherwise make "himself a plaything of mere inclinations and hence a thing" (ibid., 420). It appears that a person remains a person and not a "thing" even when he violates the moral rules, although his worth is then diminished to the point that it becomes less than that of a mere thing: "for a thing, because it is something real and given, has the property of being serviceable so that another can put it to some use" (ibid., 429).

It is not very difficult to see that this definition creates intractable problems in the social sciences, which can hardly be content with a social world organized around the principles of subject/object philosophy. Kant's *doctrines* do not articulate the universal principles of morality, as once seemed to be the case, but rather proscribe moral and legal behavior for a particular type of human being. The human beings for whom these doctrines are designed are, first of all, citizens of sovereign nation-states with civil constitutions. The problem is that the social world in neither Kant's own time nor today is comprised of sovereign nation states in which all people have equal legal rights and obey one and the same "internal law." In fact, there have always been people who have been deprived of free choice, free will, and sovereign states, regardless of the extent to which they were socially visible. Under the conditions of mass migration, the formation of multi-cultural states, and intensified

communications, the situation becomes even more complex when people find themselves equal as subjects in respect to one and the same legal system, but divided by the moral rules to which they have committed themselves. For example, one may be a moral person in his own state, but viewed as immoral in a different state, where his virtue may even be held to be a vice.⁶⁴ The same also is true for the legal system, which varies from country to country; what is permitted in one state may be a crime in another.⁶⁵ The transition to a world system of society has thus encountered previously unperceived difficulties connected with the impossibility of defining what a person is and what type of universal moral and legal norms should be imposed as restrictions upon human action and behavior.

In the social world of persons defined by philosophers from Aristotle to Kant, there is no place for those deprived of freedom for any reason whatsoever, be it historically and geographically conditioned human "nature," bad luck, or states of affairs. Stated otherwise, philosophical Logos demands that beyond the world of the subject, or the person who acts according to his free will and enjoys the right of free choice, we see nothing but objects or things to which no social existence can be granted. But by "thing" we may also understand a *psychological personality*, which is "merely the capacity for being conscious of one's identity in different conditions of one's existence," insofar as what makes a person is *moral personality*, which is "the freedom of a rational being under moral laws" (Kant 1991, 277).

In Kant's "The Doctrine of Right" we find the right "of possession of an external object as a thing and use of it as a person." This right has a *domestic* character and concerns the members of a "community of free beings who form a society of members of a whole called a *household*." This right is "neither a right to a thing nor merely a right against a person but also possession of a person" and, therefore, "lying beyond any rights to things and any rights against persons" (Kant 1991, 95). This right, strangely enough, is characterized as "the Right of humanity in our person, from which there follows a natural permissive principle, by the favor of which this sort of acquisition is possible for us." The "objects" that can be acquired according to this "right" are of three kinds: "A man acquires a wife; a couple acquires children; and a family acquires servants." The right of possessing these "objects" is the "*most personal* of all rights," and the things thus acquired are "inalienable" (ibid., 96).

⁶⁴A good example in this respect is the attitude towards lying among different peoples. While *intentional untruth* will be always *lying* for some, even if harmless and oriented towards a good end, others consider it to be a lack of humanity to tell someone a truth which is harmful to him and prefer the "noble lie."

⁶⁵For example, the possession of a weapon may be illegal in a given country even if it not be used, while in another it may be a right and almost a duty for purposes of self-defense. Gambling or the use of fireworks may be a punishable offence in one country, while it may be only innocent entertainment in another.

The solution for the moral problem thereby entailed is that each person in such a community is "acquired by the other *as if it were a thing*, the one who is acquired acquires the other in turn." What follows from this "right," which at the same time expresses the close relationship between "a right to a thing" and "a right against a person," is this: "if one of the parents in a marriage has left or given itself into someone else's possession, the other partner is justified, always and without question, in bringing its partner back under its control, just as it is justified in retrieving a thing" (Kant 1991, 97).

It can be argued that Kant's moral philosophy enters into an insuperable difficulty in this respect because it is elaborated upon the principles of *subject/object philosophy*, which does not allow for taking into account the *relations* between two subjects with equal rights. In other words, this is once again the "sin" of perceiving the world as a world of *monads*, not as a world of *relations* where the two sides constitute equally important *referents*. The transition to a world of relationships, i.e., a world of *dyads*, requires that the *no-person* also be acknowledged as another *person* since the quotation above does not convince us that the wife can be a person "exalted above any price" who "exacts respect" "from all other rational beings in the world" in the type of relation there put forward (Kant 1991, 230).

Kant made it clear that there are three types of human beings who supposedly are not to be regarded as persons, namely, wives (women), children, and servants, since, as he maintains, they cannot be "alienated" from the person. Kant seems to have emancipated the slave when he wrote that "Humanity itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be used merely as a means by any man," but "must always be used in the same time as an end" (ibid., 255). However, it still cannot be seen to what "end" women have been "used," and perhaps we also need to ask "to what end women have used men?" But the simple truth is that human relationships cannot be placed on a just foundation through the use of the "means/ends" model. In other words, the language of metaphysical philosophy is apparently unable to carry the heavy task of interpreting all human relationships.

Kant's "The Doctrine of Virtue" does not consider such feelings as compassion and pity as becoming to a man insofar as sharing suffering is not a duty (ibid., 250).⁶⁶ Such feelings seem to go counter to the requirements of *self-love* and *self-esteem*

⁶⁶In the paragraph on compassion Kant obviously echoes Plato's *Republic*, where a similar stance is taken towards feelings that are not becoming to a man. *Compassion* is here equated with a "contagious disease" that not only is not obligatory, but may be useless and even harmful: "In fact, when another suffers and, although I cannot help him, I let myself be infected by his pain (through my imagination), then two of us suffer, though the evil really (in nature) affects only one. But there cannot possibly be a duty to increase the evil in the world and so to do good from compassion. This would also be an insulting kind of beneficence, since it expresses the kind of benevolence one has toward someone unworthy, called pity; and this has no place in men's relations with one another, since they are not to make a display of their worthiness to be happy" (Kant 1991, 250).

that are duties. So, as Kant put it, one cannot "love his neighbor" as himself without contradicting himself. This can be a wish, but it cannot be guiding motive for action, for "in acting I can, without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love, one of whom concerns me more closely than another" (ibid., 246).

Modesty is defined as "(m)oderation in one's demands," which is also closely bound to the principle of self-love. Modesty is thus a "duty of virtue toward other men arising from the respect due them," which follows directly from the "restriction of one man's self-love in view of the self-love of others" (Kant 1991, 254). Kant finally notes that it is impossible to adopt the maxim of "making others' happiness one's end" as a "universal law" because reason constrains us (ibid., 247). Modesty, however, is a virtue in a world where people are engulfed by the community to such a degree that they are threatened with a deprivation of "self-love."

But although "making others' happiness one's end" may be constrained by reason, it does not necessarily contradict the principle of self-love and self-esteem. Kant apparently has in mind a particular *model of the self* that need not be *universal*. In this respect, the self-sacrificial features of altruism and the restriction of one's action by concern about the opinions of others must necessarily be explained in terms of "unreason." We cannot help but consider the possibility that such a self-negating attitude is guided by *another type of reason* that proceeds from the fact that there are people with *another type of self*. If we believe Aristotle that women and slaves have different *selves* by "nature," then we have to assume that "self-love" and "self-esteem" have more than one meaning. In order to define whether a given behavior is in accordance with reason, virtue, and duty, we must first define what the structure of the *self* is as well as what we *find in the self*. The self-love of the face in *aídos*-culture may very well have forms of expression quite different from those of the self-love of persons from guilt-culture, none of which is more reasonable than the other.

This means that the world organized around the principles of *aídos*, respect for the other, and modesty in view of one's love for others, where people seem to be deprived of self-esteem and subordinated to a collective outside authority, may be no less reasonable than that of guilt-culture, which prescribes individualism, self-interest, and self-love in view of the self-interests and self-love of others. An hypothesis worthy of consideration in this respect is that if one type of self-love seems to be altruistic and irrational, while another type seems to be egoistic but rational, this is not because various people have different understandings of what is love, but because people have different *selves*.

It can be said that Kant laid the foundation for yet another doctrine, namely, the Doctrine of Love. *Love* and *respect* are "great moral forces" for Kant, upon which the whole of morality apparently resides. "The principle of **mutual love** admonishes men constantly to *come closer* to one another; that of the respect they owe one another,

to keep themselves at a distance from one another; and should one of these great moral forces fail, 'then nothingness (immorality), with gaping throat, would drink up the whole kingdom of (moral) beings like a drop of water'" (Kant 1991, 449, §24).⁶⁷

The only problem is that this love cannot be realized in a world where the relationships between human beings are described in terms of *subjects* and *objects*, *means* and *ends*, or *things* and *no-things*. The language of metaphysics has no place in the world of basic social relationships, where the human being can be neither an object, nor a means for someone else's action. Such a subject is neither a *part* of, nor an object for another individual subject-whole, nor a subject surrounded by objects available for internalization as love-objects, useful objects, or objectives. The subject can only be a *partner* of another subject with whom he shares a common end, whose realization requires complementary skills or the performance of complementary functions.

Today, however, it seems that the world is in danger, for love no longer wants to give and demands that its debts be "paid back." But if love is "paid" for all the credit she has extended to humanity, then she will enter the kingdom of wealth and equivalent exchange and thereby cease to be what she is, namely, the other of reason. On the other hand, if the world of guilt decides not to pay but rather return love, then it will lose its rationality. Either the whole world becomes rational and love is gone once and for all, or the whole world becomes irrational and reason is defeated. An insolvable dilemma!

But true love cannot possibly want to be "paid." She only wants to be humiliated no longer, and no longer to be treated as inferior, socially useless, and parasitic. She wants her ancient status as a powerful god to be restored. Reconciliation, in which the forgotten god is asked for forgiveness, is the only possible scenario for the future of civilization. To rehabilitate love means to rehabilitate the realm to which love belongs.

Pride, Shame, and Guilt

III

Emotions of self-assessment

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SHAME

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Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

Oxford New York Toronto

Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi

Kuala Lumpur Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo

Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town

Melbourne Auckland

and associated companies in

Beirut Berlin Ibadan Mexico City Nicosia

Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press

Published in the United States

by Oxford University Press, New York

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Taylor, Gabrielle

Pride, shame and guilt:

emotions of self-assessment.

1. Emotions 2. Self-perception

I. Title

152.4 BF531

ISBN 0-19-824620-X

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD

1985

It seems prima facie plausible that shame (and not as Hume claims, 'humility') is the polar opposite of emotional pride, and so it would seem that this emotion raises no structural difficulties other than those already encountered. At least, 'feeling ashamed of something' corresponds in grammatical form to 'feeling proud of something', and the explanatory beliefs accounting for my feeling ashamed will be analogous to those which explained my feeling proud: what I am ashamed of I regard as in some respect undesirable and as connected to me in one of the possible ways discussed. But if it is the phenomenon of shame that is to be isolated then a comparison between feeling ashamed and feeling proud is not altogether to the point. To speak of someone as feeling ashamed is not to be very specific about his state. In particular, feeling ashamed may or may not be feeling shame. It is quite possible for a person to claim sincerely that he is feeling ashamed of having said or done something where this means no more than that he regrets having done that thing. 'I am ashamed of it' may function as an expression of regret or remorse which does not involve any beliefs on the agent's part concerning his own standing. Feeling shame, on the other hand, does seem to involve such a belief and so to be in this respect analogous to pride. But although there is thus some justification in linking pride and shame, the latter nevertheless has features which give rise to new problems. It introduces first of all the notion of an audience, for feeling shame is connected with the thought that eyes are upon one. And further, there is a suggestion made by a number of philosophers that there are different kinds of shame, that we should distinguish between forward-looking and backward-looking shame, or between spiritual and physical shame, or